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GROUNDING NIKE: EXPOSING NIKE'S QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LIE
Tamara R. Piety*
"[T]here is no truth except the truth you createfor yourself. 1
"This action is not about freedom of speech; it is about the right to stop
people telling lies."2

In 2003, the Supreme Court set the legal world aflutter by agreeing to hear
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 3 a commercial speech case. In taking the case, the Court
appeared to signal that a significant revision of the commercial speech doctrine
would be forthcoming. 4 Many thought that revision was long overdue. 5 The

*Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., 1991 University of Miami; LL.M.
2000, Harvard Law School. I want to extend my deepest gratitude to Ed Baker, Russell Christopher,
and Elizabeth Iglesias, each of whom gave an early draft of this paper a very close reading and offered
me detailed commentary which was of invaluable assistance. Any mistakes or deficiencies that remain
are my own. Thanks also to Keith Aoki, Tom Lininger, Gary Allison, Jon Hanson, Douglas Kysar,
Janet Levit, Madeleine Plasencia, and Gerald Torres for various comments, suggestions, and
encouragement and to my excellent research assistant, Michael Esmond, who always managed to
deliver materials for even the most vaguely worded requests.
1. SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS! 58 (2001) (quoting

Richard Edelman of Edelman Worldwide, one of the world's largest public relations firms).
2. Statement distributed by McDonald's Restaurants, Ltd. via leaflets in McDonald's restaurants
in London in April and May of 1994, explaining why it was suing two impecunious members of
London Greenpeace for libel over statements made about, among other things, the nutritional value
(or lack thereof) of McDonald's food. Available at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheetreply.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
3. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Free Speech for Companies on Justices' Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2003, at A17 (noting that Nike presented Court with opportunity to make important decision on
commercial speech); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Review Nike Case in Major Look at Free
Speech Rights of Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A12 (noting that Court faced important
decision on commercial speech in Nike); Associated Press, Supreme Court Examines CorporateFree
Speech in Nike Case, Apr. 23, 2003 (stating that Nike gave Court chance to rule on corporate speech),
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=11380 (last visited Apr. 5, 2005);
Jonathan Rauch, CorporateLying Is Bad. But Allowing It Is Good, NAT'L J., May 10, 2003 (explaining
that Court's decision could significantly impact free speech in corporate context), available at
http://reason.com/rauch/060903.shtmil (April 10, 2005).
5. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief for Amicus Curiae Center
for the Advancement of Capitalism at 5-9, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(explaining how evolution of commercial speech doctrine has created an "unworkable standard" that
has existed since at least 1983). See also Deborah J. LaFetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1206-07 (2004) (arguing that
Supreme Court's "inconsistent approach to commercial speech has led to confusion in the lower
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6
commercial speech doctrine had been under pressure almost from its inception.
The Nike case raised issues with respect to the doctrine that had never before
been presented to the Court, although these issues caused difficulties in the
lower courts7 and had perhaps generated some governmental and regulatory
uncertainty. s Thus, more than twenty organizations and the Solicitor General of
the United States filed briefs as friends of the Court on behalf of Nike.9 Seven

courts" and describing dismissal of the Nike case as unfortunate.)
6. See, e.g., Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(2000) (describing the doctrine as "unstable and contentious"); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment
and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1212, 1212-16 (1983) (describing various conceptual difficulties and problems with commercial speech
doctrine and widespread criticism of the doctrine by others when the doctrine was less than a decade
old); David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1049, 1052-61 (2004) (detailing controversy that has accompanied the doctrine from its
inception and its gradual, but unmistakable shift towards more protection for commercial speakers).
7. See LaFetra, supra note 5 (arguing that Supreme Court's approach has led to confusion in
lower courts).
& See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have Been..., 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1259, 1264-66 (2004) (describing difficulties deciding what constitutes "commercial speech" in
some cases before some district courts, including question of whether the First Amendment protects
various marketing practices of drug companies, designed to encourage doctors to use drugs for "off
label" uses). Cf. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $420 [sic] Million in Illegal Marketing Case, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2004, at C1 (describing case against Pfizer as "one of many undertaken in recent years
by federal prosecutors in Boston and Philadelphia... [to examine] efforts by drug companies to
market their drugs for unapproved uses"). Pfizer's case with the government highlights just how keen
its interest was in the resolution of the Nike case and puts its amicus brief in context. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Pfizer, Inc., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (supporting Nike).
9. According to one observer, there were twenty-two amicus briefs filed in support of Nike. See
Vladeck, supra note 6, at 1051 (noting that many amicus briefs were filed). A sample of the
organizations filing in support of Nike include Exxon-Mobil, Microsoft, the Center for Individual
Freedom, the Council of Public Relations Firms, the American Advertising Association, the Center
for the Advancement of Capitalism, and forty news organizations, including all the major networks.
At least one filing was allegedly on no one's behalf, even though it urged the Court to support
much of Nike's argument. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) at 12-13, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
Although the AFL-CIO asserted that Nike's public statements about its labor practices "have been
calculated more to mislead than inform the public," the organization nevertheless defended Nike's
right to make these statements free from the threat of liability if they turned out to be wrong. Id. at 3.
As a labor organization, the AFL-CIO's leaders are undoubtedly concerned about the prospect that
any restriction on organizational speech will have a negative impact on its own operations and
membership.
Given the Court's history of willingness to restrict unions' freedom in relation to speech related
activities, this is not a frivolous concern. See, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER'S DEP'UtlIC 153
(2004) (describing how Taft-Hartley Act made a variety of arguably speech-related activities, such as
mass picketing, sympathy strikes, and secondary boycotts a form of "unfair labor practice," thereby
undermining union power). See generally Richard Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First
Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729 (1989) (describing some
anomalies in employment and labor context with respect to First Amendment protection). The AFLCIO is probably right to be concerned even though it arguably ought not to be difficult to distinguish,
for purposes of a First Amendment analysis, for-profit corporations from those organized for purposes
other than profit. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The
Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1178-80 (2004) (discussing
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briefs, including a brief on behalf of eighteen states and Puerto Rico, 10 were filed
in support of Kasky. The Court heard oral argument with the redoubtable
Laurence Tribe arguing on behalf of Nike. 1 Relevant legal communities were
rife with speculation about how the Court might revise the doctrine, but a
change of some kind seemed certain.
Then, unexpectedly, the Court dismissed the case without rendering a
decision, characterizing certiorari as "improvidently granted."'1 2 Some concluded
that the Court had lost a valuable opportunity to revise a doctrine that was
plagued with uncertainty.' 3 Others argued that the Court's failure to address the
uncertainty of the commercial speech doctrine would have grave negative
impacts on the willingness of corporations to disclose information about their
14
operations and thereby cut off a valuable source of information.
However, just how much real "information" was at issue in the case is a
matter of some dispute because Kasky alleged that the information disseminated
by Nike was false. 15 And herein lies much of the meat of the case. Kasky didn't
just allege that Nike had disseminated false information. He alleged that Nike
had intentionally disseminated false information.1 6 He claimed Nike lied, and
Nike replied (in effect), "So what? The First Amendment protects everything
your lawsuit alleges we said, even if we lied." However, although Nike asked the
Supreme Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment, finding Kasky's claims
"absolutely barred" by the First Amendment, this is not how Nike presented its
case to the Supreme Court..
The story of how the case got to the Supreme Court, and how the argument
shifted on its way there, is the subject of this paper. It presents a point that many
commentators have missed - that Nike was asking for a constitutional right to
lie. This point is important because the ramifications of Nike's arguments, both
its initial argument and its reconstituted argument in the Supreme Court, would
be serious if the Court ever adopted them, something that the concurring and

distinction between commercial and regular speech).
10. Brief of Amici Curiae State of California et al. at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(No. 02-575).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at *1, Apr. 23, 2003, 2003 U.S. Trans LEXIS, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
12 Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 655.
13. See, e.g., J. Wesley Earnhardt, Comment, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to
Define Commercial Speech-Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do It-"?, 82 N.C. L.

REv. 797, 797-98 (2004) (arguing that the Court missed a good opportunity to clarify its position on
commercial speech).
14. See, e.g., Vicki McIntyre, Note, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving Corporate America Speechless, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1531, 1562 (2004) (asserting that the Supreme Court's decision will have
"chilling effect" on flow of corporate information); Alyssa L. Paladino, Note, Just [Can't] Do It: The
Supreme Court of California Overly Restricted Nike's First Amendment Rights in Holding That Its

Public Statements Were Commercial Speech, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 283, 293-96 (2004) (arguing that
corporate expression of commercial speech will never be the same).
15. See Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 581 (asserting that Nike "made a number of 'false statements"').
16. Id.
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dissenting opinions to the dismissal of certiorari suggest that it is inclined to do. 17
The case arose in the context of ongoing media and public scrutiny of Nike's
overseas labor practices. Nike had been trenchantly criticized for its labor
practices, particularly in Asia, and had experienced a decline in sales due to the
effect of these criticisms on consumers. 18 Nike responded to the criticisms and
decline in market position with a vigorous public relations campaign that took
many forms. Among other things, these included: letters to the editor, hiring
consultants to do an audit of its practices and to publish the results of the audit,
paid advertisements, and direct mail campaigns. 19 Marc Kasky, a citizen of
California and a consumer activist,20 filed suit against Nike in California under
California's unfair trade practices and false advertising laws 21 alleging that Nike's
various statements in the course of this public relations effort were false and/or
misleading. 22 The complaint included counts for both negligent and intentional
23
misrepresentation.
In response to this complaint, Nike filed a demurrer on the grounds that "it
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," 24 and that the relief
sought was "absolutely barred by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution."25 The trial court ruled in Nike's favor, dismissing the complaint
without leave to amend, and the appellate court affirmed. 26 A divided California
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nike's allegedly false statements about its
27
working conditions and practices constituted commercial speech.
In reviewing the decision, the California Supreme Court faced a dilemma.
Pursuant to the leading commercial speech case, Central Hudson Gas & Electric

17. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *4-5, Apr. 23, 2003, Nike, Inc. 2003 U.S. Trans. LEXIS
(No. 02-575) (arguing that restrictions must not be imposed for activity within the zone of First

Amendment protection without significant leeway).
18. The background facts leading up to the case are more fully explored in the introductory piece
to a symposium issue of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, Symposium: Nike v. Kasky and The
Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine,54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (2004), which contains ten articles
discussing the Nike case. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword: The Landmark FreeSpeech Case That Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 968-76 (2004).
19. Id. at 975-76, 1011-12.
20. Id. at 1045 (describing Kasky as an "anti-corporate crusader").
21. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief
62, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1998) (No. 994446), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/ article.php?id=3448 (last visited
Apr. 5,2005).

22. Id.
23. Id. 99 61-67a. Count I sought relief for the alleged misrepresentations on a negligence
theory. Id. I 61-64a. Counts III and IV were statutory claims that appear to encompass both
negligence and intentional misrepresentation. Id. $1968a-71a. However, for purposes of this article,
the most important claim was in Count II for fraud and deceit. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and
Injunctive Relief 11 65a-67a, Kasky (No. 994446).
24. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002).

25. Id. (quoting Nike's demurrer although no citation is given) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 249.
27. Id. at 261-62.
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Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 28 the definition of commercial
speech begins with the requirement that the speech be truthful and not
misleading in order to further analyze whether that speech can be protected
from government regulation or interference. 29 Of course, truth or falsity is
ultimately a factual issue. Here, what the court had before it was a demurrer,
that is, a claim that Kasky's complaint failed to state a cause of action. 30 At the
demurrer stage, the court must assume that all the allegations in the complaint
are true, and the complaint alleged that Nike's speech was false. It would now
remain to be seen whether discovery would permit Kasky to prove that the
statements were false. In any event, the California Supreme Court did not
31
It
decide that Nike's communications were false and misleading as alleged.
32
simply reversed the ruling that the complaint was facially defective, thereby
allowing the case to move into the discovery phase.
Discovery may well have been precisely what Nike was most anxious to
avoid, if only because of the expense. The demurrer may have been its attempt
at a "slam dunk" in order to avoid a lengthy exploration into its corporate
records. Whatever Nike's motivations were, the fact remains that what it
pleaded and then defended all the way to the Supreme Court was that Kasky's
complaint failed to state a cause of action. However, along the way, that defense
underwent a subtle metamorphosis. From the "absolutely barred" stance taken
in the trial court, Nike altered its defense to offer a fallback claim that Kasky's
complaint was deficient because it failed to allege (or to be more specific, the
California statutes on which Kasky's claims were based failed to require) actual
malice according to the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan33 standard. 34 In other
words, Nike argued that Kasky's complaint was defective because it failed to
allege that Nike's false statements were intentionally false.
Aside from the observation that Nike's use of New York Times turns the
doctrine stated in that case on its head, the biggest problem with Nike's
argument (that Kasky's complaint failed to allege that Nike intentionally made
false statements) 35 is that it is not true. Yet, inexplicably, Nike, many of the
28. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. at 566.
30. Campbell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal. 4th 311, 321 (2005) (detailing standard of
review for a demurrer).
31. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262 (stating that "[i]n concluding, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that
Nike's speech at issue here is commercial speech, we do not decide whether that speech was, as
plaintiff has alleged, false or misleading..
32 Id. at 262-63.
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Petitioners' Brief at 43-44, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). Notice that
although the heading for this subsection of the brief refers to the desirability of the application of the
actual malice standard, the majority of this subsection actually disputes the appropriateness of
allowing a private citizen to bring such a suit without the actual malice standard. This emphasis was
necessary to avoid an open challenge to the numerous governmental regulatory efforts regarding false
advertising and consumer protection, which have no such actual malice component.
35. Robert L. Kerr, From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech
Case Be Subverted to Immunize False Advertising?, 9 COMM. L & POL'Y 525, 535 (2004). Although I
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amici, and several commentators characterized the issue before the Court as one
of strict liability or negligence, observing that the issue of intentional
misrepresentation was not before the Court. 36 Even Justice Stevens appears to
have believed that the initial complaint did not allege that37Nike's statements
were made intentionally with knowledge that they were false.
In fairness to Justice Stevens and to the academic observers, as the case
moved toward the Supreme Court, these issues became blurred. 38 Nike's
Moreover,
argument was masterful in its recharacterization of the issues.
case at
to
win
the
on
attempting
focused
appropriately
counsel
Kasky's
because
the broadest level of protection (negligence or strict liability) rather than at the
narrowest (actual malice), and in the Supreme Court wanted to keep the focus
on the argument that eventually prevailed (lack of a final judgment), Kasky did
not engage with Nike's argument as vigorously as it might have done had it
generally agree with this observation about the application of the New York Times standard in the
Nike case, I note that Professor Kerr appears not to have understood that to the extent Kasky was
suing under what was described as the "private attorney general" provision of the California law, it
was not "preposterous" to treat him as if he had power of the "same magnitude of a government
official." That was precisely the posture such a provision puts him in. However, this does not obviate
the larger point made in the article: that the goals of New York Times, preserving "the people's" right
to criticize the government, is not at all analogous to Nike's "right" to self-promotion.
36. See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 18, at 973 n.31, 1030; Bruce E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L.
Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1243, 1243 & n.2 (2004) (noting that consumer protection laws permit liability whether or not the
speaker is aware of the speech's misleading character and observing in the footnote that, although
some participants in the symposium "assume" that Kasky alleged malice, "Kasky did not so
characterize his complaint in the Supreme Court").
37. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing possible decisions of the Court
that would resolve all issues below and suggesting that if the Court found the actual malice standard to
apply, then Kasky may want "to amend his complaint to allege such malice"). There may be a
distinction between whether the initial complaint was, in fact, sufficient and whether what the parties
argued was even at issue before the Court. Kasky's counsel made several statements, both in the brief
and in oral argument that lent themselves to the interpretation that Kasky was, in fact, only arguing
the sufficiency of the negligence claim. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief at 15, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (stating that "[i]f the Court reversed on the ground that the first amended
complaint does not adequately allege that Nike should have known that the statements at issue were
false...") (emphasis added). Note that this quote is preceded by a reference to the strict liability
claim that Nike made that Kasky argued was not raised below. Id. Moreover, the word "adequately"
can be read as reflecting an understanding that although Kasky pleaded knowledge, it may not have
been pleaded "sufficiently." See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-39, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
At oral argument, Paul Hoeber, counsel for Kasky, made jurisdictional arguments that there was no
final judgment and thus no standing because the California Supreme Court's judgment dealt with a
demurrer, and unless the Court was prepared to find all of Nike's speech absolutely protected, there
would be no jurisdiction because even a ruling that the New York Times standard applied would allow
Kasky the opportunity to amend, assuming that Kasky had inadequately pleaded knowledge. For
further analysis of this question, see infra notes 141-158 and accompanying text. However, that does
not obviate the fact that there was a count in the Complaint for intentional misstatement, see supra
note 23, not to mention a number of other allegations from which one could reasonably infer an
allegation of intentional misstatement, see infra notes 126-140 and accompanying text, making it
unclear what amendments would have been necessary if the Court had remanded it. Had the Court
actually reviewed this issue, Justice Stevens might well have come to a different conclusion.
38. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the procedural history of Nike.
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agreed that the New York Times v. Sullivan standard applied. That does not
mean that the complaint did not already allege precisely what Nike claimed later
the Supreme Court should have required, that is, an allegation that Nike had
intentionally lied. It did. This is important. It is important because the
concurring and dissenting opinions in the dismissal of certiorari demonstrate that
many of the arguments advanced by Nike in support of its position were
persuasive to a majority of the Court. This suggests that the next case that the
Court accepts may give commercial speakers what Nike hoped to get from this
39
case-a constitutional right to lie.
It is unclear whether, as a doctrinal matter, there is a constitutional right to
utter intentionally false statements under any circumstances. Obviously there is
no constitutional right to commit fraud, perjury, libel or myriad other wrongs
that can be committed through speech. And some statements of the Supreme
Court suggest the Constitution provides no protection for false statements. 40 On
the other hand, in other statements the Court has suggested that even if no
constitutional protection exists for false statements for their own sake, the theory
that the costs associated with policing the veracity of speech on matters of public
concern are higher than those associated with permitting false expression may
nevertheless make intentionally false statements relatively immune from liability
in some contexts.41 But whether there is any precedent for a constitutional right
to lie, an analysis of Nike's pleadings reveals this is precisely what Nike sought.
In making the case for protection for its public statements about its labor
practices Nike claimed that what was at stake was whether its voice 42 would be
39. There is, of course, a distinction between a false statement and an intentionally false
statement. I hope to illustrate here that Kasky's complaint included the latter, as well as the former, so
that by demurring to this claim, and then asking the Supreme Court to affirm the trial court's dismissal
without leave to amend, Nike was, in effect, asking for a constitutional shield from what Kasky alleged
were intentional misstatements. Given that some members of the Court appeared to accept the
argument that intentional misstatement was not at issue, it might well be that any opinion substantially
broadening the scope of protection for speech by corporations would still stop short of endorsing
protection for intentional lies. Nevertheless, if the Court were to adopt the New York Times standard
it might very well be the functional equivalent of a right to lie even if the doctrinal position remains
that intentional lies may be regulated and prohibited.
40. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating in dicta that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues").
41. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72 (arguing that "erroneous statement is inevitable
in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing
space' that they 'need... to survive..."') (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
Although this observation might arguably only apply to unintentional misstatements, the majority
opinion makes clear in a later footnote that this value may arguably even apply to intentional
misstatements to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish the patently erroneous statement, which is
nevertheless made in good faith, from the erroneous statement made in bad faith. Id. at 272, n.13
(citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 47 (1947)). The concurring opinions by Justices Black (joined by
Justice Douglas) and Goldberg (also joined by Douglas) went further and unequivocally stated that
even the actual malice standard represented an abridgment of speech rights in these circumstances. Id.
at 293 (Black, J., concurring) & 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42 See Petitioners' Brief at 44, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (describing California ruling as limiting
corporate "voice").
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heard in a matter of public concern, a concern which it characterized as
"globalization" rather than as "Nike's labor practices. '43 Nike could not claim
that it had been censored or muzzled, because it had not been. And no doubts
remained that its claims had in fact been heard. Indeed, this was precisely the
problem according to Kasky-according to Kasky Nike's statements had been
heard by too many people who were likely to be misled by them. Nike
nevertheless claimed that Kasky's lawsuit challenged the truth of those
statements. According to Nike, calling Nike to account would represent an
unbearable burden that would effectively "chill" 44 its future participation in the
"marketplace of ideas" 45 unless Nike was afforded the constitutional equivalent
of a blank check. Nike wanted a dismissal of Kasky's suit on the pleadings and
claimed that the California court's refusal to grant dismissal would result in a
serious imbalance in the "debate," 46 an imbalance to the public's detriment (not
to mention its own) since the public would not have all the "information" 47 about
the issue. It ended the argument in its Supreme Court brief with a stirring call to
uphold First Amendment values, quoting Learned Hand's observation that
"'right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
' 48
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." '
I would not have thought it possible for Nike, or its supporters like ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Pfizer, Bank of America, and other large multinational
corporations generating larger revenues than the gross domestic product of more
than half of the world's nations, 49 to cast itself as a victim and draw parallels
between its claims and those made by the defendants in New York Times,
without inspiring hoots of derision.50 However, it did not. 51 The fact that it did
43. See id. at 17-18 (stating that the case raises issues of "public concern" and engaging in debate
about "globalization").
44. See id. at 38 (noting that California Supreme Court's ruling would "chill" corporate speech).
45. See id. at 17 (arguing that majority in California Supreme Court's decision "distorts the
marketplace of ideas").
46. Id. at 18 (quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243,262 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, J., dissenting)).
47. Petitioners' Brief at 40, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (arguing that, if California decision is upheld,
corporations would be "foolish" to provide "information" to media).
48. Id. at 50 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
49. For example, Exxon-Mobil reported $21.5 billion in revenues for 2003. Available at
http://www2.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/eamings_4qO3.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
That figure exceeded the GDP of 115 out of 183 countries according to the World Bank's figures for
2003. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GDP.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,2005).
50. It calls to mind Charles Black's response to Herbert Weschsler's "neutral principles"
argument decrying the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Boardof Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955),
where Black suggested that when the question of whether segregation and the South's Jim Crow laws
offended "equality" was "solemnly propounded," he thought one "ought to exercise one of the
sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter." Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960).

51. As difficult as it may be to envision amici such as Exxon-Mobil, Bank of America, Monsanto,
Microsoft, Pfizer, the Council on Public Relations, the Association of National Advertising, and
groups such as the Center for the Advancement of Capitalism, as "freedom fighters," on par with the
labor organizers and lunch counter demonstrators of yore, they staked out a position identifying

2005]

GROUNDING NIKE

not is, I argue in this article, a matter of some concern because it suggests that
some future corporate speaker will advance a similar argument and win. And
this is problematic because the market cannot be trusted to sort out truth from
falsity in this context for a host of reasons. 2 And much about the legal
regulation of corporations with respect to their duties to shareholders suggests
that they cannot be trusted to tell the truth in the absence of a legal requirement
to do so. This prediction gains some force when one observes that both the
dissenting and concurring opinions to the Nike dismissal reflect acceptance of
' 53
some or all of Nike's arguments about "balance" and "information. "
Completely overlooked in this argument is the question of how much value

themselves with such groups. Many serious people took these positions seriously. The list of those
serious people starts with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and O'Connor, whose concurring
or dissenting opinions, or joining of the same, reflect that they took at least some of Nike's argument
seriously. In this they join Justices Thomas and Scalia, who have already indicated some warmth, if
not (in Justice Thomas's case) outright enthusiasm for the position that corporations' speech ought to
be treated as political or expressive speech. This is also the position that Professor Rodney Smolla was
spoofing (at least in part) with the title of his contribution to the Case Western symposium: Rodney A.
Smolla, Afterword: Free the Fortune 500! The Debateover CorporateSpeech and the First Amendment,
54 CASE W RES. L. REV. 1277 (2004). In addition, a number of distinguished lawyers and law
professors were arrayed on the side of Nike and its amici, many of whom drew these parallelsapparently without irony. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 14, at 1562. Also, in the first couple of law
review pieces treating the case, the student authors argue that the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity in Nike to clarify the commercial speech doctrine and that such clarification should take
the form of expanding the protection for commercial speech in the way Nike or some of its amici
argued it should be expanded. See, e.g., Free Speech Protectionsfor Corporations:Competing in the
Markets of Commerce and Ideas, 117 HARv. L. REV.2272, 2274 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme
Court failed to define adequately the commercial speech doctrine); Earnhardt, supra note 13, at 798
(arguing that the Court missed a good opportunity to clarify its position on commercial speech);
Paladino, supra note 14, at 285 (arguing that the Court's decision will chill corporate speech).
As an aside, it should perhaps not be a surprise that some of the individual corporations filing
amicus briefs were among the top twenty corporations listed by at least one knowledgeable observer
as having a "corporate credibility gap" as a result of receiving the lowest scores for "corporate
sincerity" of those listed in a 2002 Harris study. See RONALD J. ALsOP, THE 18 IMMUTABLE LAWS OF
CORPORATE REPUTATION 253 (2004) (listing Exxon-Mobil at number eleven, Microsoft at number

seventeen, and Nike at number twenty). Of course, in addition to the problem of whether a
nonhuman entity like a corporation can be said to be "sincere," there is the problem that this poll
could be capturing the resulting perceptions from bad publicity, not the reality of the corporate
"personality." However, the author, a long-time marketing columnist and commentator for the Wall
Street Journal,observes that all three of these companies "have long been viewed cynically." Id.
52. Why the market cannot be trusted to sort out truth from falsity in this context is a topic for
another article and cannot be adequately addressed in this article.
53. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens seemed receptive to the argument that Nike's speech was,
at least in part, contributing to "debate on an issue of public importance." Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 663
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also signaled that he was prepared to consider whether the
Court's prior assertion, that there was "no constitutional value in false statements of fact," was
perhaps "overbroad." Id. at 664. Justice Breyer's dissent goes even further, stating "the questions
presented directly concern the freedom of Americans to speak about public matters in public
debates." Id. at 667 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's dissent appears to agree with most of
Nike's substantive points and concludes that "if this Court were to reach the merits, it would hold that
heightened scrutiny applies," a decision he believes would result in a reversal of the California
Supreme Court's. Id. at 681.
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the public derives from false information, which is what Kasky claimed was being
put into the information stream by virtue of Nike's press releases, advertorials,
and other claims about its manufacturing processes. The basic premise of the
commercial speech doctrine, which many argue represents Nike's sole basis to
any First Amendment protection in this context, 54 is that there is a public good to
be derived from transmitting truthful information to consumers which justifies
limited protection for commercial speech. Put another way, the commercial
speech doctrine was intended to limit the government's ability to prohibit or
censor truthful information relating to commercial interests. The commercial
speech doctrine does not preclude government regulation of advertising or a
corporation's self-promotion to ensure that these communications are truthful.
The right of a natural person to express him or herself, whether those
expressions are truthful or not, good or not, has never had any parallel in the
commercial speech doctrine. In the context of commercial speech, the limiting
principle has always been that freedom of expression only exists with respect to
55
truthful expressions.
This allegation was precisely what Kasky claimed, that Nike was not telling
the truth. Yet somehow Nike managed to shift the focus away from this fact and
took most of the Court and commentators with it. In so doing, Nike painted a
picture of itself as an embattled citizen 56 merely trying to defend itself in a public
debate 57 against an unfair attempt to stifle its voice-as opposed to a multibillion dollar corporation attempting to engage in damage control and regain
market share through the free advertising of press releases. 58 But then
"constitutional protection for free advertising" just wouldn't have the same ring

54. Whether Nike's speech was commercial speech was, for many, the central issue. If the speech
was commercial speech, then all of it could be tested for its truth, and Nike might be liable for false
statements or enjoined from further false speech. If Nike's speech was not commercial speech but
rather traditional speech protected by the First Amendment, then, arguably, none of it could be tested
for its truth. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine.
55. See Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing commercial speech and
stating that there is "no constitutional value in false statements of fact") (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974)).
56. Nike's brief on the merits to the Supreme Court posed as the first of the "Questions
Presented" whether the speech of a corporation could expose it to liability for misstatements if the
speech involved matters of "public debate" arguably affecting consumers' impressions of that entity as
a "good corporate citizen." Petitioners' Brief at i, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
57. Id.
58. One textbook on advertising and promotion suggests that public relations (at least the public
relations with a marketing thrust) is a particularly useful component of an overall marketing strategy
"because the airtime or newspaper space is provided free of charge by the newspaper, magazine, radio,
or television station that prints or airs the message." TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION,
AND SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 569 (6th ed. 2003)
(emphasis added). In addition, the text notes that such messages are often more effective because
they have more credibility. "MPR [marketing-oriented public relations] messages come across not as
advertisements but as unbiased reports from journalists. An MPR message in comparison with an
advertisement assumes a mantle of credibility." Id (emphasis added). The author observes in an
endnote, "the dividing line between marketing PR and general PR is not perfectly clear." Id. at 623
n.1.
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to it.
The ascendancy of the "corporate free speech" argument is of concern
because, if arguments such as Nike's win support, they will provide a basis for
undermining much of the government's power to regulate business effectively in
a myriad of contexts (even if those arguments are not matched by the political
will to implement that power). Thus, although the weight of popular opinion
seems to lean in the opposite direction, it nevertheless seems worthwhile to bring
what are arguably the real issues in Nike back into focus and to place them in the
context in which they occur, particularly with respect to standard marketing
practices and governmental attempts to regulate those practices consistent with
the public good.
Part I of the article analyzes the complaint and Nike's responses from their
inception all the way to the Supreme Court. Part L.A describes Kasky's
complaint in detail to show that, contrary to the understanding of many
observers, Kasky made allegations in the complaint that meet the actual malice
standard set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan case. Part I.B reviews the
arguments made on appeal and tries to piece together how such an important
fact appeared to have gotten lost in the course of the proceeding.
Part II reviews the significance of what Nike sought from the courts. Part
II.A analyzes 1N1ic's request with rcspect to th concrcial spcech doctrine and
the importance of truth to the protection of commercial speech. 9 Then Part II.B
analyzes Nike's request pursuant to general First Amendment doctrine. 60 This
Part explores the question of whether there is ever a constitutional right to lie
and concludes that while perhaps no "right" to lie exists generally, the
constitutional interpretation that Nike sought would effectively have given it that
right. Thus, "a right to lie" is a fair characterization of what Nike sought from
the courts.
Part III discusses some of the implications of Nike's request in the context
where corporate speech takes place. 61 Others have discussed many of these
potential implications. Some have not. This discussion is meant to be primarily
suggestive of additional points of inquiry and research, rather than an exhaustive
review. Moreover, given how little is already actually regulated (or regulable) by
the commercial speech doctrine, the implications of Nike's argument in the Nike
case suggest that little will be left of governmental regulation over corporate
communications if these communications are broadly constitutionalized. Finally,
in this Part I describe some of the current governmental attempts to regulate
marketing that would have been imperiled if Nike's argument had prevailed, and
which are at risk if a future corporate defendant successfully makes Nike's
arguments to the Court. In conclusion, I argue that these facts are grounds for
pause before enthusiastically adopting the rhetoric that corporate interests such

58. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Nike's request in the context of the commercial speech
doctrine.
59. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Nike's request in the context of First Amendment
doctrine generally.
60. See infra Part III for a discussion of the implications of adopting Nike's request and argument.
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as Nike have been so successful at selling, because that rhetoric doesn't, in the
end, hold up to close scrutiny.
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rathera scornful tone, 'it
62
means just what I choose it to mean-neithermore nor less."
PART I
A.

Kasky's Complaint

A few of Nike's key claims to the Supreme Court were the following: (1)
that its statements about its labor practices-that is, how much it paid its
workers, working conditions, et cetera-were "matters of great public
importance" 63 and as such entitled to the highest level of constitutional
protection; (2) that Kasky's concerns about Nike's statements regarding its labor
practices went to "moral judgments," not to the "commercial harms" 6 covered
by the commercial speech doctrine; (3) that a chilling effect, due to fear of
litigation, would result without First Amendment protection, which would cause
"valuable corporate contributions" 65 touching on these "social and moral issues"
to be lost; and finally, (4) that a failure to extend this constitutional protection to
speech such as Nike's would be "unfair" because it would disadvantage or
handicap one "side" of the "debate" against the other.66 In examining the
complaint, it is worthwhile to keep these assertions in mind.
1.

The Alleged Misstatements

Kasky's complaint alleged Nike's representatives made several
representations, in numerous communications, that he summed up as
constituting seven misstatements of fact:
" "workers who make NIKE Products are protected from and not
'67
subjected to corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse.
* "NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable
'68
governmental laws and regulations governing wages and hours;
* "NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations governing health and safety conditions; '69

62. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 94 (Special ed., Random House 1946).
63. Petitioners' Brief at 19, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id. at 18. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Chin of the California Supreme Court offered this
argument in its strongest form. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (2002) (Chin, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[h]andicapping one side in this important worldwide debate is both ill considered and
unconstitutional").
67. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief I I(a), Kasky (No. 994446).
68. Id. 9l(b).

69. Id. 1 (c).
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*
*
"
*

2.

"NIKE pays average line-workers double-the-minimum wage in
70
Southeast Asia;"
"workers who produce NIKE products receive free meals and
71
health care;"
"the GoodWorks International (Andrew Young) report proves
that NIKE is doing a good job and 'operating morally';" 72 and
"NIKE guarantees a 'living wage' for all workers who make NIKE
73
products."

The Form of the Communications

Characterizing its statements as speech on a matter of public concern was
central to Nike's rhetorical strategy and critical to every point that followed.
Nike claimed, therefore, that "[t]his is not a close case ... [w]hatever the exact
margins of the category of 'commercial speech,' the statements at issue here fall
well outside them." 74 Of course, an advocate typically states his or her case in
perhaps stronger language than the situation warrants. However, viewed from
the perspective of the form of Nike's communications, the Supreme Court has
never dealt with communications that, in the main, fell so far from what some
might describe as traditional advertising. 75 Therefore, this situation makes it
worthwhile to pause and describe the form in which Nike made the alleged
misrepresentations.
None of the communications on which Kasky based his complaint

70. Id. 11(d).
71. Id. I l(e).
72. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief, l(f), Kasky (No. 994446). This is
probably the most tenuous candidate for a "statement of fact" given that what constitutes "operating
morally" seems to be open to debate. Assuming, however, that whatever "operating morally" means
encompasses the factual claims Nike made in other statements, it follows that Nike may not be
"operating morally" if these claims are not true.
73. Id. I l(g). As with the preceding claim about "operating morally," the phrase "living wage"
cannot be reduced to a fixed term in the same way that "legal minimum wage" can be reduced to a
fixed term. Taking all of the pleadings in Kasky's complaint as true, however, one would be forced to
conclude that whatever a "living wage" might be, Nike was aware that it was not paying it and,
furthermore, had no intention of paying it. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text discussing
the references made by Nike personnel to a "living wage.".
74. Petition for Certiorari at 9, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
75. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2004) (noting that "most of the cases before the Court involved
classic advertising for goods or services, and thus fell comfortably within the Court's commercial
speech definition"). The most familiar exception may have been raised in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), where a condom manufacturer included general information about
condom use and the health implications of contraception in its promotional brochure for its own brand
of condoms. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 62. The California Supreme Court relied heavily on Bolger for its
analysis in the Nike case. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251-52 (Cal. 2002). For a discussion of how
the California Supreme Court relied on Bolger in deciding the Nike case, see Erwin Chemerinsky &
Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004).
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constituted "advertising" as traditionally conceived. 76
Instead, Nike's
communications consisted of:
* letters to University Presidents and Athletic Directors, including to
some officials at schools with which Nike had contracts to give the
school money in exchange for its being a "Nike school," purporting
77
to explain or defend Nike's labor practices;
* a letter to the editor of the San Francisco-Examinerfrom Nike's
Director of Communication, Lee Weinstein, acknowledging that
Nike is aware that "[clonsumers are savvy and want to know they
support companies with good products and practices.. ." 78 and
encouraging holiday shoppers "to remember that Nike is the
'79
industry's leader in improving factory conditions;
* Nike press kits which included a Nike "Code of Conduct," a
"Memorandum of Understanding," and a document entitled "Nike
Production Primer," 80 all of which contained information about
Nike's labor practices;
* statements made by Nike CEO, Phillip Knight, at a shareholders
meeting, where he claimed that the air quality in some of Nike's
81
factories was "better than it is in Los Angeles;"
* statements made by various Nike representatives to newspaper
reporters that, despite reports pursuant to an Ernst & Young audit
of dangerous levels of exposure to toxic chemicals in Nike's
factories, the danger was minimal because workers "do not stay
more than two or three years in the factories" and that the

76. Attempting to articulate what constitutes advertising illustrates the problem in this case.
Promotional activities of for-profit entities are so multifarious and widespread in the media that
advertising variety has become the norm. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO BUY, 79-81 (Scribner,
New York, N.Y., 2004) (Under the Radar: 101 Ways to Disguise an Ad). Consequently, trying to
determine what constitutes "advertising" has become a challenge. To illustrate, one textbook defined
advertising as follows:
A form of either mass communication or direct-to-consumer communication that is nonpersonal and is paid for by various business firms, nonprofit organizations, and individuals
who are in some way identified in the advertising message and who hope to inform or
persuade members of a particular audience.
TERENCE A.

SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED

MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 648 (6th ed. 2003). In addition, two prominent commentators offered

another analysis on this subject:
In an era when corporations increasingly see news coverage as a form of PR, and news shows
as crucial forum in their advertising and public relations campaigns, the line between news
and advertising is blurred. But that does not mean that the line should not or does not exist.
Nike's statements were on the PR side of that line.
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 75, at 1148.
77. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 9122, Kasky (No. 994446).
78. Id. 9 24.
79. Id.
80. Id. 9 25.
81. Id. 9 37.
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82
improvement of the working conditions was "a work in progress;
* a letter to the editor in which CEO Knight claims that workers are
83
given free meals in addition to their wages and overtime;
" and numerous press releases and advertorials 8 dedicated to
refuting the charges made against Nike's factory working
conditions and labor practices worldwide.
Nike characterized these statements as speech contributing to the debate
about globalization. 85 Of course, another way to characterize these statements is
that they were a part of a public relations campaign to polish and resuscitate
Nike's image with the aim of improving sales, retaining sponsorship agreements
with athletes and schools, and bolstering shareholder and market confidence in
its ultimate profitability through these sales. Given a corporation's obligations
to its shareholders, the second characterization is more plausible than Nike's
86
characterization.
Kasky claimed that these representations violated the California laws
governing unlawful business practices for unfair competition and false
advertising because Nike's statements were false and made with the intent of
improving Nike's financial performance, with respect to both consumer and
institutional sales and Nike's performance in the stock market. 87 Kasky's
id
-a nt sngxly
tardwd f 1 ...
y
the. false stateents
Instead, the complaint alleged multiple theories of liability-from (perhaps)
strict liability,88 to negligence, to intentional fraud and deceit. 89 Count I is

82. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief
83. Id.

42, Kasky (No. 994446).

49.

84. The term "advertorial" attempts to capture the quality of advertising that purports to argue
an issue or take a position on some issue of public interest. It is an amalgam of "advertisement" and
"editorial," meant to signal that it has qualities of both. Nike is correct that the "ad" at issue in New
York Times was a precursor of this genre. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(appendix). That is, in New York Times, the NAACP and others paid for newspaper space-space
that ordinarily would be devoted to traditional advertising-to publish an editorial comment about the
civil rights movement and solicit funds for Dr. King's defense. Id. at 258-61. In both New York Times
and the instant case, the content of the advertorial consisted principally of text that was intended to
persuade. Of course, the difference is that the "product" in New York Times was civil rights. While
we all can be said to profit, both materially and spiritually, from an end to discrimination and racism,
Nike aimed its claim at a more tangible, monetary profit.
85. Petitioners' Brief at 1-3, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
86. These two aims are not, of course, mutually exclusive. But the dominant purpose from Nike's
perspective is surely the second one and arguably its only legitimate one given its obligations to
shareholders. It would seem then perverse to extend protection to speech that not only fills no public
good but is also not responsive to the principal motivations for the speech - unless of course it is
deemed a public good to allow a company to say anything that might increase its value, regardless of
the truth of its representations.
87. Respondent's Brief at 6, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
88. Nike claimed that the California law permitted strict liability for statements that are "literally
true" which the "Court later deems misleading; and that such liability attaches notwithstanding the
speaker's best efforts to ensure the statements' accuracy." Petitioner's Brief at 3, Nike, Inc. (No. 02575). Because the parties did not actually litigate this issue, it remains uncertain. However, the
California Supreme Court suggested that strict liability is indeed a possibility in such cases when it
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explicitly labeled as a claim for "Negligent Misrepresentation." 90 Counts III and
IV do not specify a state of mind. 91 However, in Count II Kasky alleged "Fraud
and Deceit,"'
thereby claiming that Nike's representatives made these
statements with knowledge that they were false.
Thus, it is simply not the case, as some observers remarked, that Kasky
failed to raise the issue of intentional misstatement. At the demurrer stage (the
equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), all of the plaintiff's
allegations must be accepted as true. 93 Moreover, pursuant to California law, the
reviewing court is to "give the pleading a reasonable interpretationby reading it
as a whole and all of its parts in their context. ' 94 The demurrer raises the
question, "Does this state a cause of action?" and not, "Are these allegations
true?" Whether a claim states a cause of action must be analyzed by looking at
what the law requires and what the plaintiff alleged.
3. California Law
The California Supreme Court noted California's unfair competition law
("UCL") defines "unfair competition" to include "'any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertisingand any act prohibited by [the false advertising law (sections 17500 to
17930)].' 95 Counts I to III of Kasky's complaint specifically relied on this
provision. 96 In examining California's false advertising law ("FAL"), the court
noted the law:
makes it "unlawful for any person ....corporation..., or any
employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or
personal property or to perform services ...or to induce the public to
enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate...
before the public in this state.... in any newspaper or other
publication.., or in any other manner or means whatever.., any
statement, concerning that real or personal property or those
services... which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue
or misleading.... "97

observed that California laws encompass not only false statements, but also statements which may be
literally true yet are nevertheless capable of deceiving the public. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250.
89. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 11 61-67a, Kasky (No. 994446).

90. Id. I 61-64a.
91. Id. 99 68a-71a.
92. Id. I 65a-67a.
93. See, e.g., Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (noting requirement that all pleaded facts be taken as true).
94. Id. (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)) (emphasis added).

95.
added).
96.
994446)
97.

Kasky, 45 P.3d at 249 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2002)) (emphasis
61-69a(b), Kasky (No.
See Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief
(alleging Nike engaged in unlawful business practices in violation of California law).
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500).
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Indeed, Count IV of Kasky's complaint specifically rested on section 17500
98
of the California Business and Professions Code.
The court further noted the UCL's scope was "broad" 99 and permitted the
violations "of other laws to be treated as unfair competition that is
independently actionable."''0 The court added:
Here, for instance, plaintiff's first amended complaint alleged that Nike
and the individual defendants violated the UCL by committing actual
fraud as defined in and prohibited by Civil Code section 1572 and
deceit as defined in and prohibited by Civil Code sections 1709 and
1710.101
It is instructive to see what these laws provide.
Pursuant to section 1572 of the California Civil Code, "actual fraud"
includes all of the following:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
does not believe it to be true;
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the
information of the person making it, of that which is not true,
though he believes it to be true;
3. The suppression of that which is true, by one having
knowledge or belief of the fact;
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or
1°2
5. Any other act fitted to deceive.
Similarly, section 1710 of the California Civil Code defines "deceit" as:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
does not believe it to be true;
2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
has no reasonableground for believing it to be true;
3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it,
or who gives information of other facts which are likely to
mislead for want of communication of that fact; or,
10 3
4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
Although the definitions of both fraud and deceit include negligent
misrepresentation, 1°4 they also unmistakably include intentional misstatement.
In light of the negligence claims already made elsewhere, the most "reasonable
interpretation" is that Kasky intended to allege intentional misstatement. 10 5
9& See Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 1$] 33-34, Kasky (No. 994446).
99. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 249.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1572 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
103. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710 (West 2004) (defining deceit as prohibited per section 1709)
(emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., id. § 1572 (finding actual fraud where a person makes positive assertion that is "not
true, though [the person making it] believes it to be true").
105. See Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
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Indeed, the specific factual allegations support this reading. °s
Nevertheless, Nike represented in its Brief to the Supreme Court that "the
counts of Kasky's complaint do not allege that Nike was anything more than
negligent in making the statements he claims were false or misleading."' 1 As
evidenced by the above analysis of the complaint, the statutes in question, and
the facts alleged, Nike's representation is simply not true. Why and how, then,
did this representation become (for at least some observers, including Justice
Stevens) the posture of the case? Although it may not be possible to definitively
answer this question, reviewing the record offers some hints. Perhaps an even
more thorough analysis of the docket and transcripts would definitively settle the
matter. Even so, if a definitive answer exists, it did not make its way into the
briefs filed with the Supreme Court. However, the complaint is part of the
record, and the claims it raised are there for all to see.
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
B.

108

The Road to the Court

One can construe Nike's demurrer as an admission, only for purposes of
considering the demurrer, that all Kasky's pleaded allegations are true but
nevertheless, fail to state a cause of action. 10 9 Because Kasky did claim in his
complaint that Nike's representatives knowingly and intentionally
misrepresented the seven alleged statements of "fact," 0 the inescapable
conclusion is that Nike was asserting that the First Amendment protects such
knowing and intentional misstatements.
Despite its earlier position in the California courts, that no amendment
would suffice to save the complaint, Nike suggested in the Supreme Court that
an amendment to the pleadings might save the complaint from a demurrer. It
urged the Court to adopt the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan l as an alternative to simply reversing the California Supreme Court's
ruling." 2 This was not the argument Nike made in the California trial and
(stating court gives pleading "a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in
their context") (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)).
106. See infra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
107. Petitioners' Brief at 6, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (emphasis added).
108. CARROLL, supranote 62, at 94.

109. See Sunset Drive Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212 (stating that for purposes of considering a
demurrer, the court will "assume the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of
facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial
notice has been requested and may be taken").
110. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the seven alleged
statements of "fact" listed in Kasky's complaint.
111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. Petitioners' Brief at 43-44, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575). It is interesting to note that this
argument is a second-line of defense. That is, it comes toward the end of the brief, and although the
heading suggests that this section of the brief is directed at the adoption of the New York Times
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appellate courts when it claimed the First. Amendment "absolutely barred" a
cause of action such as that pled by Kasky. 113 And both California courts
adopted this position; the trail court by dismissing the complaint without leave to
amend and the appellate court by affirming the dismissal.11 4 Thus, in making the
suggestion to the Supreme Court that an amendment was necessary in order for
Kasky to state a cause of action, Nike not only retreated from its earlier
"absolutely barred/no amendment possible" position taken earlier, but it also
necessarily implied that Kasky had made no claim that amounted to an
allegation of "actual malice." Yet, as set forth above, this is not true. Thus, the
question arises, how did Nike make this argument, and why did it succeed?
Some possibilities are discussed below.
1. Actual Malice
One possibility is that "fraud" and "deceit" did not immediately suggest the
same standard as "actual malice" to some readers. An examination of the
factual circumstances in New York Times illustrates why this might be so, as well
as the absurdity of the parallel Nike attempted to draw between itself and the
defendants in New York Times. Most importantly, the case makes clear that the
standard the Court imposed in New York Times is the same one Kasky pleaded.
That is, "actual malice" and "fraud" and "deceit," as defined by the California
statutes in question, represent essentially the same standard.
In New York Times, the defendants were various individuals, as well as the
New York Times Co., who had purchased and run an advocacy advertisement
soliciting contributions for the defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in an
The advertisement made
upcoming trial in Montgomery, Alabama. 115
allegations about police practices in Montgomery regarding the civil rights
movement. 116 Although the advertisement did not mention him by name, a
Montgomery-elected commissioner accused the defendants of libel. 117 Because
he was the supervising commissioner of the police department, the plaintiff
claimed statements in the advertisement libeled him by making several
allegations that the police under his supervision had engaged in improper

"actual malice" standard, most of this section is actually an attack on the "private attorney general"
provision of the California statute that allows individual citizens to sue on behalf of the public.
Compare Petitioner's Brief at 43-44, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (section II, B entitled "Because
California's Legal Regime Will Predictably Chill Much Protected Speech, This is An A Fortiori Case
for the Application of the "Actual Malice" Standard" and discussing the standard) with Petitioners'
Brief at 44-50, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (discussing private attorney general provision). Also, the prayer
for relief simply claims "the judgment of the California Supreme Court should be reversed." Id. at 50.
It does not specify whether it is seeking affirmance of the appellate court's decision to affirm the grant
of the demurrer without leave to amend. Id. Nevertheless, it seems fairly obvious that this would have
been the optimal result for Nike.
113. Petitioners' Brief at 43-44, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
110. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854,857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
115. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256-57.
116. Id. at 256-58.
117. Id.
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conduct.1 18 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, announced
that in order for the plaintiff to prevail in his libel action, he would have to prove
that any misstatements of fact were made with "actual malice."11 9 Justice
Brennan defined "actual malice" as "knowledge that [the statement] was false or
...reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 120 Justice Brennan's
definition clearly parallels section 1572 of the California Civil Code, which
provides for liability if a defendant makes a "suggestion, as a fact, of that which
1 21
is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true."
Even so, the lower court in New York Times rejected a jury instruction on
malice that contained a slightly different definition, 122 thereby highlighting the
inapt comparison between the New York Times defendants and Nike. The trial
court rejected the defendants' request for a jury instruction denying available
punitive damages upon a showing of "malice," if there was no evidence that the
misstatements in question were "motivated by personal ill will, [sic] that is actual
intent to do the plaintiff harm."'123 In other words, in order to receive punitive
damages pursuant to this instruction, the New York Times plaintiff would have
had to show that the defendants knowingly intended to harm him with
falsehoods in making their allegations and that the defendants had done so
because they were motivated by "ill will." Had the trial court given this
instruction, the jury could have conceivably concluded that the defendants had
knowingly made false statements but were nevertheless off the hook if they had
not done so pursuant to "personal ill will." Both the words "personal ill will"
and "malice" connote a bad intent toward the target of the speech, an intent to
harm. Although the consensus reading of the New York Times "malice"
standard means "intentional, '124 intentional misstatements about others made
with the intent to do them harm is different from intentional misstatements
about oneself intended to do oneself good. "Malice" is not a word that attaches
very comfortably to the latter situation.
It would clearly be absurd to require Kasky to show that Nike made its
statements pursuant to "personal ill will." In the Nike case, Kasky alleged that
Nike made misstatements about itself. One can hardly be expected to prove that
Nike's misstatements were "motivated by ill will" toward itself, or that they were
calculated to do itself harm. To the contrary, the falsity, if the statements were

118. Id.
119. Id. at 279-80.
120. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280.
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572 (West 2004).
122. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 262 (noting that the trial judge refused to charge "that
the jury must be 'convinced' of malice, in the sense of 'actual intent' to harm or 'gross negligence and
recklessness"').
123. Id. at 284 & n.24 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Boyd C. Farnam, Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler Magazine v.
FalweU, The New York Times Actual Malice Standard and IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress,

63 IND. L.J. 877, 883 (1988) (noting that actual malice standard requires "intentional or reckless false
speech").
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false,12 would benefit Nike. The motivation for a false statement about oneself
runs in the other direction because Nike was not motivated by malice, but rather
self-inflation.
Nevertheless, these subtle differences may have confused
observers.
2. Pleading Ambiguities
A second possibility for the ease with which Nike steered observers away
from the truth of the pleadings is a pleading ambiguity in the complaint that was
raised by Nike in its brief to the Supreme Court. In making the claim that
Kasky's complaint never alleged that Nike was "anything more than
negligent," 126 Nike observed, "[Kasky] pointedly alleges not that Nike misspoke
purposefully or with reckless disregard of the truth but rather . . . 'with reckless
disregard of the laws of California prohibiting false and misleading
statements.' 127 With due respect to Nike's counsel, this seems to be
hairsplitting. What is the difference between speaking with reckless disregard of
the truth and reckless disregard of a law that requires you tell the truth? None it
would seem. While some inherent value may exist in knowledge of the law for
its own sake, the intent of the allegations in Cotint II of the complaint seems
fairly straightforward. 128 Moreover, as noted above, California law requires that
the complaint be given a "reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and
t9
all of its parts in their context.'
Viewed as a whole, with "all of its parts in context," it seems fairly clear that
Kasky intended to allege intentional misstatement by Nike, as well as negligent
misstatement or strict liability. In the first place, paragraph 28 of the complaint
specifically notes that certain representations with respect to wages and hours
were "intentionally and/or recklessly misleading and deceptive.' 30 Moreover, in
paragraph 36 he alleges "Nike's representation that its products are
manufactured in compliance with applicable laws governing wages and hours is
13
deceitful.' '
Nike acknowledges that the first of these assertions is in the complaint but
claims that Kasky did not "advance" this assertion in the actual counts of the
complaint. 132 Left unexplained is how a claim for "fraud" and "deceit" can fail
to advance such a claim, given that the fraud statute prohibits, among other
125. Recent disclosures by Nike suggest that, as Kasky alleged, many of Nike's claims were false.
See David Teather, Nike lists
abuses at Asian factories, THE GUARDIAN, April 14, 2005 at
http://www.guardian.co. uk/ethicalbusiness/story/0,14713,1459135,00.html (last accessed on 5/18/05).
126. Petitioners' Brief at 6, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 11 65a-67a, Kasky (No.
994446) (alleging fraud and deceit).
129. See Sunset Drive Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218 (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)) (emphasis added).
130. First Amended Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 1 30, Kasky (No.
994446).
131. Id. 36 (emphasis added).
132. Petitioners' Brief at 6 & n.1,
Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
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things, "[tihe suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not
believe it to be true.' 133 Intentional disregard of a law that prohibits one from
making a suggestion that he or she knows is not true would seem to encompass
an allegation of intentional misrepresentation. Likewise, it appears Kasky
intended to allege intentional misstatements by Nike with regard to its
"Memorandum of Understanding."
Nike states in its "Memorandum of
Understanding" that its products are "manufactured in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations regulating wages and overtime." 134 Kasky
alleges that representation is false because it fails to inform readers of
"documented violations of the prohibitions of China's and Vietnam's labor laws
against forced overtime and against excessive overtime."1 35 In doing so, Kasky
suggests this omission was not only intentional but also "fraudulent" and
"deceitful" as those terms are defined in the applicable laws recited in Count II.
In addition, it is reasonable to draw an inference of intent from the
allegations taken as a whole. Although not necessarily paralleled in California
law, the federal pleading rules require fraud to be pled with specificity, but
136
provide that malice, intent, and other states of mind may be pled generally.
This, therefore, requires enough detail with respect to fraud as to allow an
opponent to be able to adequately respond. 137 However, state of mind requires
no such detail. 138 A review of the complaint as a whole, read reasonably,
certainly allows for the inference that several, if not all, of the misstatements
Kasky attributes to Nike were intentionally made. One of the most obvious of
these is the reference to a "living wage."
In paragraph 59 of the complaint, Kasky alleges that Nike issued a press
release on October 27, 1997 in which Kathryn Reith, Nike's Manager of
Women's Sports Issues, is quoted as follows:
NIKE is fulfilling our responsibility as a global corporate citizen each
and every day by guaranteeing a living wage for all workers...
and
139
creating opportunities for women's financial independence.
However, the next paragraph asserts that this claim is false and offers the
following statement made a month earlier by Dusty Kidd, Director of Nike's
Labor Practices Department, to Prema Mattai-Davis, Ph.D., Chief Executive

133.
134.
135.
136.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572(1) (West 2004).
Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 28, Kasky (No. 994446).
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating that "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other

condition of mind of a person may be averred generally").
137. See William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud:Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S.CAL.
L. REV. 959 (stating that "The purpose of [requiring fraud to be pled with particularity] is to give the

defendant fair notice of exactly what the charge against him consists of in order that he may fairly
answer the charge.").
138. The absurdity of charging a corporation with a "state of mind" represents a distinct
challenge and could be the topic of an entirely separate article.
139. First Amended Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 1 59, Kasky (No.
994446).
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Officer of YWCA of America:
I am fully cognizant of the call on the part of some for a "living wage."
That is generally defined as sufficient income to support the needs of a
family of four. We simply cannot ask our contractors to raise wages to
that level-whatever that may be-while driving us all out of business,
4
and destroying jobs, in the process.10
This passage certainly supports the reasonable inference that-whatever a
living wage may be-Nike knows that it does not pay it, does not intend to pay it,
and indeed views requests for a living wage as tantamount to an attempt to drive
it out of business. That further supports the reasonable inference that Kasky, in
claiming that the first statement by Kathryn Reith on behalf of Nike is false,
means that it is intentionally false. Ultimately, Nike's attempt to engage in
hairsplitting legal analysis and semantic games to avoid acknowledging that
Kasky's complaint alleges intentional misstatement, in addition to negligence, is
simply unpersuasive.
3. Ambiguity in Argument
There remains one more potential source for the perception that Kasky did
not allege intentional false statements: according to Nike this was the statement
made by Kasky's counsel. And it is possible to interpret some of those
statements, made at various points during the trip to the Supreme Court, as
conceding that intentional misstatement had not been pled. However, when
analyzed more closely, it does not appear that any of these statements amounted
to such a concession. At most, they could constitute a waiver of arguments that
had been pleaded.14 1 However, a waiver of an argument is not the same as never
having pleaded the argument in the first place. Further, it does not undermine
the argument that what Nike sought was a constitutional right to lie when it filed
its demurrer. Indeed, some of the confusion that subsequently arose is possibly
attributable to this pleading stance, a stance that Nike attempted to shift once it
appeared before the Supreme Court.
As reviewed above, in response to Kasky's complaint, Nike filed a demurrer
on the grounds that, among other things, the First Amendment "absolutely
barred" the plaintiff's claims. Apparently, the parties made no mention of the
possibility of dismissal with leave to amend to properly plead under the New
York Times standard. Moreover, the trial court dismissed without leave to
amend, leading to the conclusion that it believed the First Amendment was an
"absolute bar" to Kasky's complaint, notwithstanding the allegations of
intentional misstatement. Nike briefed and argued the case on this basis to the
California appellate court, which agreed with the trial court and affirmed its
ruling of dismissal without leave to amend.
The crux of the argument in the California courts was that Nike's speech
140. Id. j 60 (emphasis added).

141. In a conversation with the author, Alan M. Caplan, Esq., one of Kasky's lawyers, asserted
that to his knowledge no such waiver had ever been made or intended. Telephone Interview with
Alan M. Caplan, Esq., Partner, Bushnell, Caplan & Fielding, LLP (Sept. 14,2004).
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was "political," not "commercial" speech, and therefore, the First Amendment
was a complete bar to Kasky's action. On Kasky's appeal to the California
Supreme Court, Nike dedicated its entire brief to various aspects of this
argument. 142 Likewise, Kasky's appellate brief stated that the issue was whether
Nike's statements were "commercial speech" and recognized that if the court
resolved this issue in Nike's favor, the statements are "immune from
regulation."' 143 Of course that would be a concession of immunity from
regulation under the unfair trade practices and false advertising law, which was
the basis of the lawsuit. Such a concession would not have any bearing on
whether there might be liability under libel law. But since this was not a libel
case and Nike wasn't accused of libeling itself, there was no reason for any one
to raise the New York Times standard.
Thus, Nike's counsel, Kasky's counsel, and the judges at both the trial and
appellate level seemed to be operating with the understanding that if Nike's
speech constituted political speech, then Kasky could not bring suit at all.
Indeed, the granting of a demurrer to Nike suggests that this was the lower
courts' reasoning. As Nike reports, the appellate court apparently saw "'no
reasonable possibility that [the complaint] could be amended to' satisfy the First
Amendment." 144 No one mentioned the New York Times actual malice standard.
Kasky own argument reflected the understanding of all concerned because, at
that point, Nike had not yet raised its New York Times claim. Once the issue was
before the Supreme Court, Nike changed strategies (and counsel) 145 and
apparently awoke to the fact that a possible New York Times claim existed, even
if its speech fell within political speech. At that point, apparently for the first
time, Nike asserted that the New York Times standard was the proper standard
for evaluating Kasky's claims. 146 In making this argument, Nike faced an
obstacle-Kasky had alleged intentional misstatement (the equivalent of the
actual malice claim). In order to avoid any misrepresentation to the Supreme
Court, Nike's brief had to very carefully parse Kasky's complaint, looking for
ambiguities and using the utmost care in its own representations of the facts to
avoid an outright misrepresentation itself. Thus, the assertions in Nike's brief
that appear to claim Kasky never pleaded intent are themselves somewhat
ambiguous. The brief contains the following statements: "Respondent invokes
statutes that impose liability without requiring that Nike spoke with reckless
disregard for the truth or purposefully lied. To the contrary, liability under the

142. Respondents' Brief at 5-37, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 2000 WL 108256 (Cal. 2000) (No. S087859).
138. Respondent's Brief at 41-46, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (arguing that "Nike's representations
about the conditions under which its products are made ... have no immunity from laws regulating
false or misleading commercial messages").
144. Petitioners' Brief at 14, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Counsel for Nike in the California Supreme Court was Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 246 (Cal. 2002). Counsel of record for the certiorari petition added
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, as well as Professor Laurence H. Tribe. Petition for Certiorari, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 2002 WL 32101098 (U.S. 2002) (No. 02-575).
146. Even so, this claim appears to be nothing more than a "back up" claim. Nike's clear
preference was (and logically would be) for the Court to affirm the dismissal.
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' 147
state Unfair Competition Law is 'strict.'
Whether the statutes Nike referred to in its brief require reckless disregard
or purposeful lies does not address whether Kasky pled such intent (which the
above analysis illustrates he did). Moreover, while Kasky invoked a statute that
apparently does not require (which does not mean it excludes) purposeful lies or
reckless disregard, he did invoke the statutes involving fraud and deceit that do.
Similarly, Nike attempts to fold its semantic distinction (between reckless
disregard for the truth and reckless disregard for the laws of California that
require the truth) into a claim that "the counts of Kasky's complaint do not
allege that Nike was anything more that negligent in making the statements he
claims were false or misleading."' 148 As discussed above, this distinction is
disingenuous and unconvincing.
With respect to the demurrer, Nike attempted to argue, in light of its new
theory, that because Kasky "did not assert that he could plead that Nike had
acted with reckless or deliberate disregard for the truth,"' 149 he must have waived
this argument, presumably on the theory that if it was not raised, it was waived.
Nike did acknowledge that there was what it characterized as a "'scattershot'
150
attempt to argue that he could amend his complaint" on other grounds.
However, it is hardly surprising that Kasky would not offer to amend in order to
add something that was already there. Nike seemed to take the position that
unless Kasky conceded the complaint needed to be amended, he waived this
claim. However, it is easy to understand why Kasky would not be prepared to
concede the arguments on negligence or strict liability, given that these would be
broader bases for a finding of liability.
Given all this verbal legerdemain in the pleadings before the Supreme
Court, it is understandable that, in oral argument before the Court, counsel for
Kasky, Paul Hoeber came to be discussing this issue with a Court that apparently
had a different understanding of the facts in mind.' 51 In this discussion, Hoeber
made comments that appeared to some to represent a concession that the
complaint needed to be amended. The better reading is that he was merely
agreeing with the observation that the California court's reversal of the grant of
the demurrer did not obviate the possibility of an amendment, should the lower
court think one was necessary. This is just a matter of basic civil procedure. It is
not a concession that an amendment was necessary.
The key exchange took place in the context of Hoeber's (winning)
argument that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. He argued that reversing
the grant of a demurrer simply allowed the case to go to trial and thus there was
no final judgment as required by Article III and the Court's prior precedent in

147. Petitioners' Brief at 1, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
14& Id. at 6. This claim is repeated on page twelve, presumably relying on the argument made
earlier on page six. Id. at 12.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id.
151. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-44, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
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ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish.152 Hoeber began his argument on this point 53 and
became embroiled in the following line of questioning with respect to an
amendment to the pleading.
MR. HOEBER: [T]here is no final judgment because this is ... the
overruling of a demurrer,....
[Blecause it's a-it's a demurrer, and the question is the sufficiency of
the complaint against the demurrer, Nike has to show that plaintiff
could not amend the complaint in response to, or respondent could not
amend the complaint in response to the-whatever defect might beQUESTION: I don't see thatQUESTION: -that's what the intermediate court of appeals said in
California. I would think that's pretty good authority.
MR. HOEBER: What the court of appeals said in California was that
we could not amend the complaint, or the facts in the-in the
complaint could not be amended to allege noncommercial speech,
noncommercial speech, and that's true.
We don't claim that we would allege noncommercial speech. For one
thing, the statute only covers commercial speech, 54 and it's a red
herring in that sense, where under us-that we would lose the course of
action and we couldn't proceed, so yes, the court of appeal did finish by
saying, we don't see any reasonable possibility that the complaint can
be amended to allege noncommercial speech, so that - 155
Here, Hoeber was referring to the fact that at the intermediate appellate
level, the entire argument focused on whether Nike's comments were within the
definition of commercial speech because, if they were not commercial speech,
the Unfair Competition and False Advertising laws would not provide a basis for
the suit. Thus, Kasky could not amend his claim under this construction of the
issue because no amendment, including one to incorporate the New York Times
"actual malice" standard, would offer a basis for the claim. Obviously the cause
of action involved in the New York Times case, libel, also does not offer a basis
for the suit.
What Nike attempted to do, and succeeded in doing, was to inject into the
proceedings an argument that even if the Court should find that its speech was
"commercial speech" for purposes of the California statute, it should engraft
onto that statute an "actual malice" requirement. This was a new argument.
However, as Hoeber got ever more entangled in arguments attempting to
152. Respondent's Brief at 6, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605 (1989)).
153. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-30, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
154. Of course, if by "the statute" Hoeber meant the Unfair Competition Law, it encompasses
far more than commercial speech. What seems clear in this reference is that Hoeber meant that if this
is not commercial activity falling within the scope of the government's regulation of economic activity,
that particular statute would no longer provide a basis for a claim. This does not mean that some
other statute might not provide a basis for a claim.
155. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
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illustrate that no final judgment existed, he made more statements that were
capable of being interpreted by those who accepted Nike's characterizations of
the pleadings as concessions that Kasky had not pleaded intentional
misstatement.
QUESTION: May I-may I interrupt to go back to your article, your
final judgment argument for just a moment with respect to this?
Supposing that we should hold that in a case like this, where you don't
have Article III standing, that the case may not go forward unless the
plaintiff can meet the New York Times standard, prove actual malice
and gross negligence and all the rest, but it could theoretically go
forward if those allegations were made.
My question is, is it your understanding, as a matter of California law
and a matter of the history of this case, that you would have the right
to-to file an amendment to your complaint making those
allegations?156
It was at this point that Hoeber perhaps should have answered something like,
"Absolutely your honor, although in this case we would not have to amend
because the complaint already contains allegations to that effect." Instead, he
simply answered: "Absolutely, Absolutely." 157 (Of course this observation,
made in hindsight, requires him to have anticipated that the Court was operating
from a fundamental misunderstanding.)
Simple agreement at this point, even though it was only to a hypothetical
proposed by the Court, could have been construed as agreement that, in fact,
such an amendment was already necessary because no allegation meeting the
New York Times standard was in the complaint. Of course, this was not
accurate. It was in the complaint, 158 albeit not in the form of an explicit
reference to the New York Times standard-which is not surprising because
Nike was not a libel case.
At the end of the day, despite all the ambiguities in the briefs and the
arguments described above, it simply cannot be said that Kasky did not raise the
issue of intentional misrepresentation in the complaint. Given that he did raise
intentional misrepresentation, one cannot similarly deny that in demurring to the
complaint, as opposed to simply defending itself on the merits of the question of
intentional versus any other kind of misrepresentation, Nike was asking for a

156. Id. at 40-41.
157. Id.at 41.
158. To illustrate just how confusing the argument became, at one point Hoeber appeared to
suggest that the complaint did not allege negligence either. Hoeber stated the following:
We appealed to the California Supreme Court because we felt we were right on the law, and
the California Supreme Court agreed with us. If-the California Supreme Court had said,
you're wrong on the law, you've got to prove negligence, maybe the California Supreme
Court would have done that. We would have then amended the complaint and proved
negligence.
Id. at 37. Throughout, Hoeber was trying to underscore the argument that a denial of a demurrer is
not a final judgment. Ultimately, he proved convincing on this ground since the absence of jurisdiction
was the basis for the denial of certiorari. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 655 (stating that "[t]he writ of
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted").
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constitutional shield for intentional misrepresentations. Even in the First
Amendment context this is neither a trivial request nor one to which the answer
is a forgone conclusion. However, as will be discussed below, it is a particularly
egregious request in the context of commercial speech.
Of course, whether or not Nike's speech was "commercial speech" or some
other kind of speech was precisely the issue as Nike framed it. However,
concluding that something is not commercial speech does not make it speech that
is immune from liability. Arguably, this is an insight that occurred to Nike's
counsel in the process of framing the petition for certiorari and that had
apparently not occurred to them before, resulting in the addition of the New
York Times wrinkle to its argument.
All manner of speech may be actionable: fraud, libel, defamation, perjury,
sexual harassment, obstruction of justice, bribery, and so on. The list may go on
and on. However, it appears that what Nike wanted, and thought it could get,
was a constitutional blank check with respect to speech on matters of "public
concern." Why it wanted that and what the implications for society as a whole
may be is the subject of Part II of this article. What is at stake is the
government's power to regulate commerce and economic activity because, at the
end of the day, Nike's speech in this case was self-promotion directed at
economic ends. However, it is worth starting with an examination of what Nike
was attempting to get out from under (or around) in arguing that the commercial
speech doctrine did not apply to its speech here. This article will then more fully
consider whether a "constitutional right to lie" exists and whether, even if such a
right exists as a practical matter in some contexts, this case represents the sort of
context that merits one. I propose that an examination of the circumstances of
this case suggest the answer to that question is a resounding "no."
"'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's
all."159
PART II
A.

Truth and CommercialSpeech

Truth has a particular relevance in the context of the commercial speech
doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine's premise is the assumption that whatever
protection commercial speech may or may not be entitled to, its protection is
dependent upon the communication being truthful. However, as a threshold
matter, it was not always clear that commercial speech was entitled to any
protection at all. 16° In all the fuss about freedom of speech for corporations and

159. CARROLL, supra note 62 at 94.
160. For the proposition that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech prior to
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), see Thomas W.
Merrill, First Amendment Protectionfor Commercial Advertising: The New ConstitutionalDoctrine,44

U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 205 (1976) (noting that "[u]ntil recently, the majority of courts upheld such
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references to the venerable status of the rights of freedom of expression under
the First Amendment, 161 it is easy to lose sight of the fact that mere possibility of
such a claim is a product of late-twentieth century thought, not a venerable
principle of long standing. Previously, the majority opinion seemed to be that
corporations, at least their corporate advertising, 62 did not enjoy any First

regulations [of advertising] under the Supreme Court's ruling in Valentine v. Chrestensen that 'purely
commercial advertising' is unprotected by the [F]irst [A]mendment"); Alan B. Morrison, How We Got
the Commercial Speech Doctrine:An Originalist'sRecollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189, 1189
(2004) (noting that "[u]ntil the mid-1970s, 'purely commercial advertising' was considered outside the
scope of the First Amendment, and hence entitled to no protection"); Robert Post, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (stating that "[in 1976, the United States
Supreme Court reversed its long standing conclusion that 'the Constitution imposes no... restraint on
government' regulation of 'purely commercial advertising"'). But for an apparently contrary position
see Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have Been..., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259,
1261 (2004) (stating that "[t]here can be little doubt that some (if not all) of the corporate
communications at issue in this case would, before 1976, [the year Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy was
decided] have been fully protected") (I rather suspect that this statement is not meant to suggest that
commercial speech was protected prior to 1976, but rather to characterize the statements at issue here
as clearly political and to suggest that it was the advent of the commercial speech doctrine that called
into question whether they were protected by calling into question whether they ought to be classified
as conunercial speech.).
For the proposition that the idea of "commercial speech" as a category dates from Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History
of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 747, 756 (1993) (discussing how the First Amendment makes
no distinction among types of speech, how we have no evidence that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned speech as divisible into the categories of commercial and noncommercial, and how it was
not until 1942 that the Supreme Court made the distinction explicit); and Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1990) (stating that "[in 1942,
the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air" in Valentine v.
Chrestensen).
For the unusual position that protection dates from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, see Robert
L. Kerr, From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech Case Be
Subverted to Immunize False Advertising?, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 525, 526 (2004) (stating that "the
Court opened the door to First Amendment protection for commercial speech in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan").
161. Nike's own brief offers one of the most florid examples. In discussing the undesirability of
the government testing Nike's statements in this case for their truth, Nike noted:
[L]aw is a great teacher, and the lesson taught by the state's gratuitous assumption of that
awesome power [to test for truth] must be how superfluous it is for individuals to participate
vigorously in public debate and to evaluate for themselves the statements of others: the
promise that an official truth may be obtained through citizen-initiated litigation threatens to
reduce the informal process of public controversy that the First Amendment thus far has
been understood to embrace at its core to little more than a dress rehearsal.
Petitioner's Brief at 50, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (emphasis added). Stirring rhetoric. A closer
examination of the circumstances here suggests that the urgency is misplaced-at least as to the
public's interest.
162. There is some confusion about the definition of commercial advertising. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (defending the line between commercial and noncommercial
speech); James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism:
Lessons From Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES.L. REV. 1091, 1091-92 (2004) (discussing the California
Supreme Court's split as to classification of Nike's speech). The quotes above, supra note 160, reflect
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Amendment protection at all. That was the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 63 a case where the distributor of a handbill tried to
circumvent anti-littering ordinances that would limit distribution of his
advertising circular by appending discussion of an issue of public concern on the
reverse side of his advertising handbill. 164
Chrestensen had a submarine docked at a pier on the East River for which
he planned to charge admission to view. 165 Chrestensen had initially distributed
a flyer advertising its presence when the Police Commissioner advised him that
distributing such advertising handbills was illegal. 166 The Commissioner noted,
however, that handbills related to public information or protest could be
distributed freely. 167 Showing that he was not a man to be easily deterred from
his objective, Chrestensen had his handbills reprinted so that on one side they
had the advertising information and on, the other side they carried a protest
168
against the City Dock Department's failure to offer him wharfage facilities.
Even with the addition of this non-advertising "protest," the police restrained
Chrestensen's attempt to distribute his handbill, and so he brought suit seeking
an injunction against interference with their distribution. 169 Chrestensen claimed
that the additional material entitled his handbill to protection under the First
Amendment and that the Commissioner's action in enforcing the ordinance
70
against him represented an unconstitutional abridgment of this right.
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Court found little
difficulty in reconciling the proposition that "the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion"' 171 with the notion that the government might regulate commercial
activity on those same streets. 172 With respect to the former, the Court noted
that significant restraints existed on what sorts of burdens any governmental
entity could place on those rights. 173 At the same time, the Court noted, "[w]e
are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restrainton government as
respects purely commercial advertising."174 The Court found Chrestensen's
argument that the advertising and public information portions of his handbill

this confusion. From one standpoint it is obviously not the case that commercial speech is only
advertising because cases such as Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products,463 U.S. 60 (1983), clearly extend
the scope of commercial speech to more than advertising. On the other hand, as these quotes indicate,
"advertising" is often used as if it is coextensive with "commercial speech."
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52-53.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id.

168. Id.
169. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53-54.

170. Id. at 54.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added).
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were "inextricably attached"1 75 to be unpersuasive. It found that the case's facts
led to the inescapable conclusion that the protest was added "with
the intent,
76
and for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance."1
The opinion in Valentine is a brief one. 177 Apparently, the Court in 1942 did
not think that Chrestensen's argument about the intertwined nature of the
advertising and the non-advertising content warranted much discussion or
attention.
It appeared self-evident to the Court, as well as to most
commentators, that commercial advertising simply was not "speech" for
purposes of the First Amendment. 178 It would be over three decades before the
Court would revisit this conclusion and introduce a limited exception.
The Court introduced an exception in Bigelow v. Virginia179 in 1975. In
Bigelow, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statewide prohibition on
8
180
The statute provided criminal penalties.' '
advertising of abortion services.
The state prosecuted the editor of a newspaper that carried advertisements
announcing the availability of legal abortions in the state of New York, and he
was convicted. 182 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and observed that
the Virginia courts had "erred in their assumptions that advertising, as such, was
entitled to no First Amendment protection."' 183 Of course, the "error" was
understandable in light of Valentine. However, the Court in Bigelow did not
offer much more guidance about what sorts of protection advertising did have.
The Court ameliorated that lack of direction when, in the following year, it
decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.184 There, a citizens' advocacy group sued the State Board of Pharmacy,
the licensing body for pharmacists in Virginia, objecting to its prohibition on
pharmacists advertising prescription drug prices. 185 The Board's position was
that such advertising could lead to unprofessional price wars, with detrimental
effects on the profession and ultimately the public. 186 The citizens' group
responded that such arguments smack of paternalism and that the government

175. Id. at 55.
176. Id.
177. Indeed, the opinion is only four pages in length. Id. at 52-55.
178. An additional issue is whether "advertising" is a subset of "commercial speech." While it is
possible that at its inception the two labels might arguably have been viewed as coextensive or as
synonymous, this is no longer the case. The word "advertising" now seems to be one arm of what
might be called marketing. The issue of whether the commercial speech doctrine should be extended
to cover marketing efforts that are more difficult to classify as "advertising" is one way to characterize
this case.
179. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
180. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811.
181. Id.
182 Id. at 812-13.
183. Id. at 825.
184. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
185. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 749-51.
186. Id. at 767-69. As I have noted elsewhere, this argument, while based on some dubious
factual grounds, was not clearly spurious or incredible.
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had no business keeping people in the dark about simple factual issues as price
simply for their own good. 87 The Supreme Court agreed.
First, the Court noted, perhaps unnecessarily because newspapers and
books would be governed by a contrary rule, that speech "does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it."' 188 Still, the Court
was not prepared to accord what it termed "commercial speech" 189 the same
status as political speech or artistic expression. 190 The Court had traditionally
seen these categories as having potentially multiple sources of justification, but
one justification was almost certainly the expressive component. 191 In contrast,
the Court extended protection to commercial speech on the premise that its
value was almost exclusively in the listeners' right to hear it rather than in any
right of the speaker to say it. 192 Virtually all of the Court's justifications in this
case for protecting commercial speech to any degree involve the consumer's
right to hear about the information. The Court stated the following:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we
preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those

187. Id. at 769-70.
18& Id. at 761.
189. Once again, note the tendency to conflate "advertising" with "commercial speech," even
though the latter is a larger category than the former. The Court noted that, in contrast to Bigelow
where the advertisement in question arguably contained non-commercial elements to the extent that it
advertised the availability of abortions, the advertising of drug prices "squarely" presented "the
question [of] whether there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech."' Id. at 760-61.
190. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73. In particular, footnote 24 of the opinion
makes some attempt to differentiate between commercial speech and other types of protected speech,
concluding, "a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." Id. at 771-72 n.24.
191. See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602-03 (1998) (explaining
that constitutional protection of artistic works turns "simply on their expressive character").
192. For a fascinating exposition of how this argument made its way to the Supreme Court and
eventually won the day, see Morrison, supra note 160. Professor Morrison participated in the Virginia
Pharmacy case through Public Citizen. Id. at 1189. The case's genesis makes clear that from the
outset this issue was framed as one of consumer protection. Although, as Collins and Skover note,
"the path to the courthouse door is not a one-way street," Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover,
Foreword: The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn't.- The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 965, 1045 (2004), that does not mean that a shift from consumer protection to expressive
interest protection is either inevitable or that the second argument is inherent in the first. It certainly
is not inevitable if one is able to distinguish human beings and interest groups or organizations from
for-profit enterprises, a distinction that is neither invidious nor nonsensical. See, e.g., C. EDWIN
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 202 (1989) (stating that "the domination of profit
...breaks the intrinsicconnection between speech and any vision, or attitude, or value of the individual
or group engaged in advocacy") (emphasis in original); see also C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics,
and Citizen Freedom: The CommercialSpeech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163
(2004) (stating that it is "idiocy" to argue that "society consists of two opposing types of 'beings,' each
equally worthy of moral and legal concern - people and corporations").
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decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
1 93
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
It goes without saying that this observation presupposes that the
information is truthful and accurate since it would hardly seem that the "free
flow" of false information is "indispensable,' ' 194 (except of course if one is
attempting to perpetrate a fraud). The Court did not, in fact, leave this unsaid.
Indeed, it premised this new protection, which it found" to be encompassed in
the First Amendment, 195 on the observation that it applied only to commercial
196
speech that was truthful and not misleading.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding in CentralHudson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 97 in which the Court set
forth the test for commercial speech that still controls today. 198 There, the Court
noted, "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising.
Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity."' 99 The Court has never
disavowed this foundation for commercial speech, even as it appears to have
moved toward a more protective understanding of the corporate interest in
speaking. 2° ° This requirement, that the speech be truthful, is in fact what has
made the commercial speech doctrine serve, in some ways, as the mirror image
of First Amendment doctrine with respect to issues of public concern. It is often

193. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 765.
194. Actually, although I make this argument here and the commercial speech doctrine is
premised on it, economists might disagree. Arguably, if people had accurate information on, for
instance, the real cost of interest on credit cards or the comparative benefits of bargain versus salon
shampoo, or any number of other things, they might not consume at such high rates as they do at
present. I have written an article which suggests that consumption is dependent far more on emotional
and other "irrational" processes than rational ones, see Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent":
An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial
Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377 (2001), but this does not mean that rational processes never
operate to affect purchasing decisions. To the extent that rational processes might affect consumption
in negative ways, it may very well be plausibly argued that our economy does depend upon the
injection of a lot of false or misleading information for its stability. It seems undeniable that the
nation's economy is now dependent upon what might be called "irrational," or hyper-consumption.
Much of that consumption is surely generated by material that is "informational" only in the very
loosest sense of that term.
195. It is interesting to note the semantic issues raised in the way the Court phrases what it is
doing-using terms that suggest its holding is found or immanent in the law-and what commentators
fairly universally agree the Court is doing-making new law. That, too, is the subject of another paper
altogether.
196. Va. State Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771-72.
197. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
198. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. at 564.
199. Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
200. See David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered,54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2004) (stating that "[t]he Central Hudson test no longer gives deference
to government judgments or upholds restraints on commercial speech as long as they are reasonable
and proportionate to the interests served, as it did as recently as a decade ago").
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observed that in the paradigmatic First Amendment case, "truth" is the very
thing that the government cannot regulate or test, even while it remains free to
impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in some circumstances.
This raises the next question that Nike's pleadings suggested: does the
Constitution forbid a lawsuit (hence the demurrer) alleging the defendant
intentionally made a false statement, even outside the commercial speech
doctrine, where clearly no such rule exists?
B.

Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Lie?

From a lawyer's perspective, the obvious response to this question is
another question-"In what context?"-because, of course, fraud and deceit are
actionable in both tort and contract law. Similarly, criminal law prohibits
perjury. The commission of lies can result in committing or evidencing many
other violations of criminal law. Thus, the real question is: in the context of the
First Amendment, does a constitutional "right" to lie exist in any context? The
answer to that question may depend, as it so often does, on whether one asks:
"does a right to lie exist as a doctrinal matter?" versus "does a right to lie exist as
a practical matter?"
Doctrinally, the answer is "maybe," in some circumstances. On the one
hand, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,20 1 the Court noted: "Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,
has never been protected for its own sake."2°2 Moreover, as noted above,
obviously, there is no constitutional right to commit perjury, no constitutional
right to engage in theft by fraud or deceit, no constitutional right to lie in the
course of the execution of a contract, and no constitutional right to lie to a
federal investigator conducting a criminal investigation-or in any one of a
203
number of areas in which it must be said that there is no right to lie.
Nevertheless, some of the resolution to this question may be found in the
observation that lies have never been protected "for their own sake," suggesting
that in fact they may be protected for other reasons. Indeed, First Amendment
law dealing with speech involving matters of public concern is replete with
rhetoric suggesting that such a right may exist as a byproduct of the protection of
superior interests to the governmental interest in punishing lies, that is,
protection of free and open discussion of matters of public concern.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2°4 the Court observed, "[E]rroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and .. .it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to
survive,"' thereby clearly indicating protection for erroneous statements of fact
in the context of political speech. 20 5 On the other hand, protection for error is
201. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
202. Va. State Bd.of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).

203. See supra Part II.B, first paragraph, for a discussion of contexts in which there is no right to
lie.
204. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
205. Id. at 271-72.
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not the same as protection for deliberate falsehood. Nevertheless, the Court
suggested, in a citation to John Stuart Mill, that to the extent a claim of
deliberate falsehood might be an easy one to make, the Constitution might
20 6
entitle even statements alleged to be lies to a certain level of protection.
In support of this observation, the Court quoted from On Liberty where
Mill wrote:
[T]o argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the
elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion ... all this,
even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect
good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other
respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent,
that it is rarely possible, on adequate grounds, conscientiously to stamp
the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could
law
20 7
presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct.
Although the Court, in adopting the "actual malice" standard of proof for
libel involving public figures and issues of public concern, ultimately declined to
adopt Mill's position that the law should not "presume to interfere" in such
cases, 20 8 the citation reflects some comfort with the notion that occasional
protection for even intentional falsehoods is defensible in this area. The
concurring Justices, Black and Goldberg,
joined by Douglas, went further and
endorsed this more radical position. 20 9 In the commercial speech area, the Court
has steadfastly held to the position that in order to qualify for First Amendment
protection, the speech must not be "misleading." 210 The Court has stated that
"[t]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.1211 However, the
Court's statements have been more equivocal with respect to speech involving
matters of public concern. Here, its proclamations lend themselves to the
interpretation that even if there is not precisely a constitutional "right" to lie, the
constitution will nevertheless shield speakers in some circumstances from judicial
or other governmental inquiry into whether what they say is true.
Thus, at least with respect to libel, there is no constitutional right to lie per
se to the extent that a speaker may still be held liable for intentional
misstatements that amount to libel, even with respect to a public figure and
matters of public concern if those statements were made with actual malice.
Still, the Court clearly intended the actual malice standard to be a high one, a
standard that would be difficult to meet and which would provide for early

206. Id.
207. Id. at 272 n.13 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 47 (1947)) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 279-80.
209. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J. concurring) (offering opinion that malice
is too "elusive" and "abstract" a concept to sufficiently protect First Amendment rights at issue); see

also id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result) (arguing in favor of "absolute, unconditional"
privilege to criticize public officials).
210. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Central Hudson,

447 U.S. at 566) (stating that "[flor commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading").
211. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974).
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disposal of cases not meeting this standard. There is some evidence that the
2 12
Court has been successful in that aim.
When Nike filed its demurrer to Kasky's claim of fraud and deceit, it was
asking for more than even New York Times provided with respect to intentional
misstatements. In its brief to the California Supreme Court, Nike argued:
The truth and validity of statements comprising a public dialogue on
matters of public interest must be resolved by the public without the
intervention of the courts. As this Court stated in Wilson, 13 Cal. 3d at
659: "The concept that a statement on a public issue may be suppressed
because it is believed by a court to be untrue is entirely inconsistent
with constitutional guarantees and raises the spectre of censorship in a
most pernicious form."
Because the First Amendment operates to ensure that the people
decide what is true or false on matters of public interest through
unfettered debate . . . the courts have "consistently refused to
recognize an exception for any test of truth-whether administered by
judges, juries, or administrative officials." New York Times, 376 U.S. at
271. Erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate, and must be
tolerated to ensure that freedom of expression maintains the
"breathing space" necessary to survive. Id. at 271-272. Thus, when
213
speech addresses public issues in the public forum, truth is irrelevant.
"Truth is irrelevant." This is the argument Nike made to the California
Supreme Court in defense of the lower courts' decisions-that Kasky's claim
could not be heard, notwithstanding its allegations (as set forth above) that
Nike's statements included intentional misrepresentations. "Truth is irrelevant."
Whether Nike's interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent is correct, and
perhaps it is not, it is pretty clear that what Nike wanted was a constitutional
shield for any statements it made that it believed could be characterized as a
statement "on matters of public concern." 214 Its argument suggested that the
primary way one could identify whether something was a matter of public
concern was with reference to the speech's format, i.e., letters to the editor
responding to commentary in the New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle,
215
as well as a variety of press interviews, press releases, and open letters.
As David Vladeck so cogently noted, however, this argument, that Nike's

212. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1985) (holding that the New
York Times evidentiary standard applied to motions for summary judgment, thereby justifying a grant
of summary judgment in favor of journalists in that case upon a showing, not adequately controverted,
that reporters in question engaged in appropriate due diligence). It is not clear whether this higher
burden of proof has in fact sheltered more defendants from libel suits, but it seems clear that this was
the intent. That intent would seem to encompass sheltering some intentional misstatements where the
plaintiff is simply not able to muster sufficient evidence of intent as the price to be paid to protect
those statements made in good faith.
213. Respondents' Brief at *13, Kasky, 2000 WL 1508256 (Cal.) (No. S087859).
214. See id. at *2 (arguing First Amendment protected Nike's comments on public issues because
the statements clearly were not advertisements) (emphasis added).
215. See id. (asserting Nike's comments are noncommercial because the company "responded to
charges ... in an open debate" via media outlets traditionally afforded First Amendment protection).
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speech was a matter of public concern, "would apply with equal force to
deliberate, calculated lies as well as unintentional falsehoods. Nike would thus
be open to the charge that it was asking the Court to give corporationsa 'right to
lie'--an accusation Nike understandably was anxious to avoid. '216 Vladeck
suggests that Nike added a "second leg to its argument" precisely to avoid the
charge that it was asking for a constitutional right to lie, 217 by suggesting that
intentionally false statements are actionable if they meet the New York Times
actual malice standard, when the object of the speech is a public figure, and the
speech involves matters of public concern. 218 It was too late. Nike could not
avoid its earlier claims.
It is undoubtedly true that Nike was anxious 219 to avoid the appearance of
making such a request. To the extent that observers such as Vladeck, Collins,
Skover, and a host of others read the record as not raising the issue of intentional
misstatements, then I suppose that Nike's efforts were successful. It succeeded
in conveying the impression that the complaint never alleged that Nike had
intentionally lied. Of course, as described in detail above, this is simply untrue.
Regardless of misunderstandings may have arisen in oral argument, and no
matter how artfully Nike dodged the reference in the complaint to intentional
and knowing misstatement, the fact remains that an allegation of intentional
misstatement was in Kasky's complaint. Nike's principal position, throughout
the case, was that the ruling of the lower courts should have been reinstated and
the demurrer sustained without leave to amend on the grounds that the first
amendment provided it immunity from suit for these statements. That is a
request for a constitutional right to lie.
Nike's attempt, at the eleventh hour, to analogize itself to the defendants in
New York Times also bears the hallmarks of an afterthought because the analogy
does not really hold up. As noted above, in New York Times, the Court
protected defendants accused of making false statements about others,
specifically governmental officials from liability for those statements unless they
were made with actual malice. Nike wanted protection for its own statements
about itself. Put another way, Nike was seeking the actual malice standard
protection for what Nike itself said about itself, not for what others said about
Nike. The word "malice" is surely an awkward fit in this context because one
cannot expect Nike to have malice against itself. But perhaps the focus on New
York Times helped make more plausible what was arguably was otherwise a

216. Vladeck, supra note 200, at 1062-63 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 1063.
218. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 (stating that when speech involves a public figure,
the plaintiff must show that allegedly defamatory statements were made with "actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not") (emphasis
added).
219. It is perhaps more appropriate to say that Nike's "officers, directors and lawyers were
anxious." But such sentences emphasize how deeply the anthropomorphism of corporations goes in
our language. Itrequires conscious effort to purge sentences of the attribution to corporations of
feelings, motivations, sentiments, intentions, etc. Exploration of examples of the same and
explorations of the potential sources for it could probably provide the basis for a separate article.
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risible contention, that Nike was a victim.
It is "telling," 220 as Collins and Skover note, that although "Nike vigorously
221
refuted Marc Kasky's claims, it never filed a defamation suit against him."
Nor did it ever bring a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
("SLAPP") suit against Kasky arguing that his lawsuit represented an attempt to
impede the exercise of Nike's speech rights. 222 Collins and Skover describe the
failure to bring a SLAPP suit as "curious." 223 Maybe it is "telling," but arguably
it is not at all "curious," given that in either scenario, Nike would have been the
plaintiff and thus would have had the burden of proving that Kasky's allegations
were false. It seems fairly clear that this is precisely the issue Nike wanted to
avoid having aired. Rather, what it sought was protection from liability for any
misrepresentations made in what was, in effect, an attempt to boost sales
through better public relations.
Public relations, as a subset of marketing, is ultimately about sales, not
about ideas. That is the heart of the issue here-could a court hold Nike liable
for false statements made in the context and format of public relations, rather
than in a traditional advertising format, which were intended to boost its
corporate image and thus, ultimately, its profits? This is an important question
because at least two major government prosecutions, in progress or recently
concluded, rely upon the ability of the government to monitor statements made
by corporations in the format of public relations. Had Nike's argument won that
day, these prosecutions, and a number of other areas of governmental
regulation, might well have been in jeopardy.
'[I]t would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do224next, as
I suppose you don't mean to stop here' [said Humpty Dumpty].
PART III
A. Misstatements Outside of TraditionalAdvertising
Modern marketing requires that product marketing consist of far more than
a simple communication of the nature of the goods and their price. It includes
225
the creation of all types of associations, not all of them overt sales pitches.

220. Collins & Skover, supra note 192, at 1043.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 974 & n.34.
223. Id. at 974 n.34.
224. CARROLL, supra note 62, at 94-95.
225. As one author of a popular college text on copywriting and advertising puts it:
Advertising isn't a thing.
It's an active relationship.
It's something that happens to a person, whether reader, viewer, listener or someone not
paying much attention.
It's not just the ad, it's the response to the ad.
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Marketing vehicles create these associations, in ways that range from traditional
forms like direct mail and advertising, to such innovations as "corporate image
advertising,"' 22 6 product placements in movies, and stealth marketing campaigns
where actors pose as consumers to tout the benefits of a particular vodka or
camera to targets who think they are simply friendly strangers.2" All these
efforts begin with the intent of adding to the bottom line. Everything about the
company becomes relevant to its bottom line because, as Nike itself noted, one
of the things its customers care about, both ultimate consumers and institutional
consumers such as schools, is the manufacturer's reputation. 228 This includes
statements made through the vehicle of public relations press releases.
The argument that for-profit, corporate speech made in the public relations
context ought to be encompassed within the commercial speech doctrine is an
issue I take up in another article. 229 However, for present purposes it is enough
to note that much of the promotional activity engaged in by for-profit
corporations takes place in this context-some of it in the form of the
"advertorial," like Wal-Mart recently took out with respect to its labor
' 231
practices, 230 and some of it in more subtle forms intending to serve as "news.
At present, the government has viewed statements made in this context as
susceptible to testing and liability.
The most prominent example of this position is the current rackcteering
case against various tobacco companies, their parent companies, and two of the
nonprofit organizations set up to operate as public relations arms of the tobacco
industry, namely, the Council for Tobacco Research and its predecessor, the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee and the Tobacco Institute. 232 The
It's not what happens in the ad, it's what happens inside the person.

That's how advertising works. Advertising that does not do that merely "talks to itself."
BRUCE BENDINGER, THE COPY WORKSHOP WORKBOOK, The Copy Workshop, 90 (1993) (layout and
emphasis in original).
226. TERENCE A.

SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF

INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 325 (6th ed. 2003).
227. See Deborah Branscum, Editorial, Under the Radar, CMO, Dec. 2004 (describing "stealth
marketing") availableat http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/120104/under the-radar.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005).

228. See Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 1 24, Kasky (No. 994446)
(stating that "[c]onsumers are savvy and want to know they support companies with good products
and practices...") (quoting Nike's Director of Communications Lee Weinstein's letter to the editor,
published in SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec. 14, 1997) (emphasis added).
229. Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising. The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
230. See Nat Ives, Wal-Mart Turns to Ads to Address Its Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005

(reporting that Wal-Mart took out full-page ad to defend its labor practices) available at
http://nytirnes.com/2005/01/ 14/business/media/14adco.html?8seia (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
231. See JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE Is GOOD FOR YOU! 179-96
(1995) (describing in Chapter 11, All the News That's Fit to Print,practice of item "placement" where
PR appears as "news").
232 See generally First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 99-CV-02496) (bringing
action to recover health care costs paid by federal government for tobacco-related illnesses caused by
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government alleged that the non-profits helped tobacco companies "carry out
their fraudulent course of conduct [by acting] as public relations and lobbying
arms of the Cigarette Companies. '233 The complaint alleges a conspiracy on the
part of these parties "to deceive the American public about the health effects of
smoking." 234 The strategy alleged in the conspiracy claim is that the tobacco
companies conspired to present a united front on the health issues raised by
smoking. The complaint alleges they agreed to "deny that smoking caused
disease and to maintain that whether smoking caused disease was an 'open
'235
question,' despite having actual knowledge that smoking did cause disease.
In furtherance of this conspiracy, the government claimed that, among other
acts, the defendants "made false and misleading statements to the public through
press releases, advertising, and public statements, such as before Congress, that
' 236
were intended to be heard by the consuming public."
Had Nike prevailed, would the tobacco companies now be able to assert a
First Amendment defense to these claims? Might this not be the sort of defense
that the tobacco industry so desperately needs now that the wall of
impenetrability to liability it had built up over the years has crumbled? Like the
tobacco company defendants, Nike's alleged misstatements were not restricted
to traditional advertising. Surely the health consequences of smoking are as
much matters of public concern as is globalization. Like the tobacco companies'
interest in the health effects of smoking, Nike has a more than academic interest
in this issue. Of course, arguably Nike's labor practices do not concern matters
of public health-at least not Americans' health. However, the parallels are
striking.
Similarly, according to an article in The New York Times, the drug giant
Pfizer entered into a plea agreement last year with the United States in response
to an indictment that the activities of the marketing representatives of its merger
partner, Warner-Lambert, represented illegal marketing. 23 7 The company pled
guilty and agreed to pay $430 million dollars to resolve the criminal and civil
charges. 238 The United States had accused the drug giant of engaging in various
marketing and promotional activities with respect to its epilepsy drug,
Neurontin. 239 The complaint alleged that the company encouraged doctors, to
whom it marketed directly, to prescribe the drug for off-label uses, such as to
treat bipolar disorder, Lou Gehrig's disease, attention deficit disorder, and

products made and sold to consumers by various tobacco companies), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/ tobacco2/DOJ%2OWeb%20-%20Amended%2OComplaint.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2005).
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id. at 2.
235. Id. at 15.
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Gardiner Harris, Pfizerto Pay $420 [sic] Million in Illegal Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Late
Edition), May 14, 2004, at C1 (correction appended June 10, 2004).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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The issue of advertising and marketing practices for
several others. 24°
prescription drugs is one of great public interest at the moment, given Vioxx's
recall and the questions raised by prescription drugs' direct to consumer
marketing, a separate issue from the subject of the Pfizer case, which was its
241
marketing efforts made to doctors.
Why wouldn't the acceptance of Nike's argument in the Nike case imperil
prosecutions such as this one against Pfizer? Perhaps it is also no accident that
Pfizer filed an amicus brief242 in Nike? Like in the tobacco cases, the marketing
efforts that were, in part, a target of this lawsuit, did not take the form of
traditional advertising. Why might Nike's argument, had it prevailed, not
implicate any sort of speech activity that could be construed as part of a
"legitimate debate"? Assuming doctors are free to prescribe a particular drug
for a use not yet approved by the FDA, and scientific support exists that use for
this "off-label" purpose is appropriate, then why can't the drug companies argue
that when sales representatives engage doctors in conversations to alert them to
these uses and to urge them to prescribe the drug for these uses, they are part of
a "debate" (or as the tobacco companies put it, an "open question") about the
efficacy of the drug for this purpose? Perhaps it could be argued that such
promotional activities constitute a "protest" against unfair FDA restrictions. In
this case, wouldn't these arguments arguably represent an obstacle to the
government's attempts to regulate drugs and drugmakers if First Amendment
defenses could be raised in this context?2 43
240. Id. An update to this piece clarifies that the company's guilty plea did not include a plea
with respect to the marketing issue:
An article in Business Day on May 14 about Warner-Lambert's settlement of a federal
lawsuit over the marketing of the epilepsy drug Neurontin referred imprecisely to a related
plea of guilty by the company. Warner-Lambert, now part of Pfizer, pleaded guilty to two
criminal charges-that it failed to provide adequate directions for Neurontin's use and that it
engaged in interstate sale of an unapproved drug. While Warner-Lambert had been accused
of paying doctors to prescribe the drug for unapproved use, that charge was not part of the
guilty plea. The guilty plea and a fine settled all of Pfizer's civil and criminal liability to the
federal and state governments.
The correction appeared June 10, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=
FBOAIFFD34580C778DDDAC0894DC404482&incamp=archive:search (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
241. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Prime Time Pushers, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2001 (stating that
"Pharmaceutical companies spent an estimated $1.7 billion-on TV advertising in 2000"), available at
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2001/03/drug.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005); Nat Ives,
Madison Ave. Sharing Drug Makers' Pain, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2004, at C1 (stating that Pfizer
suspended advertising of Celebrex after spending $87.6 million in major media ads in 2003); Stuart
Elliott, With or Without Vioxx, Drug Ads Proliferate,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2004, at C17 (noting that
critics complained that marketing of Vioxx directly to consumers over-stimulated demand for the
drug, which had to be withdrawn because of its health risks).
Like Nike, the pharmaceutical companies view their advertising pitches as "information ....From
our point of view, one of the main purposes of direct-to-consumer advertising is education,' says Emily
Denney, a program manager in public affairs at AstraZeneca." Belkin, supra.
24Z See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Pfizer, Inc., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(No. 02-575) (arguing that First Amendment should protect Nike's statements).
243. Apparently even some marketing professionals don't think that drug companies should be
left to self-police advertising claims. CMO magazine, a magazine for marketing executives, offered the
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Tobacco and prescription drugs are only two areas of current interest
involving questions of protection of public health, not just protection of
consumer information, which could be affected if an argument like Nike's
prevails in the future. However, there are a number of other areas related to the
public interest, which may be similarly detrimentally affected because the
government's ability to regulate in these areas might be curtailed or imperiled if
the Court accepts the corporate free speech argument offered by Nike.
Therefore, it is useful to review in a little more detail some of the arguments
Nike used to make its claim in the Kasky case. Many of these arguments have
been discussed in more detail elsewhere, but a brief review is useful to
underscore the point of the potential scope of impact if its claim had prevailed.
B. Environmental, Labor,and Other "Moral" Claims
One of the claims that Nike hit hardest on, and which many of its supporters
echoed, was that when consumers seek information about labor or
environmental practices, these are non-commercial areas. Thus, if they receive
false or bad information the harm isnot a commercial harm. 2 44 It may harm
consumers' moral interests to get false information about these topics, but these
interests, Nike claims, are not the proper targets of government regulation.
"There is only the most attenuatedlink between public statements on important
social, political, and moral issues-which generate heated responses and
245
debate-and consumer purchasing decisions."
This statement raises several possibilities.
First, if you accept the
proposition that the statements by Nike to which Kasky objected addressed
"important social, political and moral issues," then you have to conclude that
Nike was willing to spend an enormous amount of time and money on an issue
with only the most "attenuated" link to purchasing decisions. That seems
implausible. If, on the other hand, these issues had a strong, rather than
"attenuated," link to consumer purchasing decisions, such as suggested by the
letter urging consumers during the Christmas season to remember Nike was a
"leader" in its labor practices, 246 then maybe they were not statements that were
primarily concerned "important social, political and moral issues" as much as
important commercial issues-at least for Nike. And if these categories overlap,
that is, if these "important social, political and moral issues" implicate Nike's
commercial interests, why wouldn't that be true for consumers as well? Thus,
why wouldn't it be the case that false statements related to those interests would
be every bit as harmful to consumers interested in Nike's labor practices as
would be false statements about quality, i.e., that the shoes were manufactured

following question in a poll to readers: "Should the government increase its regulation of
pharmaceutical ads, or can the industry be trusted to make truthful claims and warn consumers of
health risks?" As of May 18, 2005 78% of respondents felt that "more regulation is needed." See
http://www.cmomagazine.com/poll/ (last accessed on 5/18/05).
244. Petitioners' Brief at 35-38, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575).
245. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
246. Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive Relief 24, Kasky (No. 994446).
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with leather when they were not? 247
It is unclear that labor or environmental practices are any less legitimate
areas of consumer interest (and thus regulation) than whether the products are
made in America, (as opposed to overseas) or by the blind or by Native
Americans, 248 assertions that are the subject of government regulation and have
been around for awhile. These regulations would have been placed in jeopardy
if Nike's position had prevailed. However, the problem is not limited to existing
regulations. Problems such as environmental degradation are too large to be
solved solely by governmental regulation. They require consumer cooperation
in order to have real effect.
To make real dents in problems like global warming will require widespread
changes in consumer behavior. This is not to say that governmental regulation is
irrelevant. It is not. And one of government regulation's values is, as an
exemplar, to provide leadership as to social goals. However, these goals will
remain elusive without widespread voluntary compliance. One of the ways to
accomplish compliance is through purchasing decisions. Consumers can use
purchasing decisions to indicate preferences for certain types of labor and
environmental practices, and bring to bear that powerful economic incentive, the
profit motive, which the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council249 noted would provide some assurance that proper
regulation would not wholly chill commercial speech. 250 Harnessing that
incentive to social goals like a cleaner environment is a legitimate governmental
goal. Simply setting out as a limitation that assertions with respect to these areas
must be demonstrably true does not seem to be an onerous burden on for-profit
entities. Indeed, despite protests in Nike's briefs of the difficulties inherent in
251
ensuring that any statement made about Nike's far-flung empire is accurate,
247. Douglas Kysar has made a convincing argument that such concerns, at least where "moral"
concerns can be construed as "process" concerns, are of legitimate interest to consumers and are
worthy of protection from fraudulent misrepresentation as product features such as price and quality.
See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/ProductDistinctionand the Regulation
of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).
248. See Brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae at *16-20,
2003 WL 1844784, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing some of Nike's
statements were commercial speech because a claim about a company's manufacturing facilities is as
easily verifiable as one referencing all particular products, and government has an interest in
regulating all such factual claims).
249. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
250. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 767-70 (finding that in regulating the professional
standards of its pharmacists, Virginia cannot suppress flow of prescription drug price information
because that information is protected by the First Amendment). For a broader discussion of the
interconnection between the status of consumer and that of citizens and historical efforts to mobilize
consumption power and choices for political ends, see generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS'
REPUBLIC (2003).
251. See Petitioners' Brief at 40, Nike, Inc. (No. 02-575) (describing difficulties of making "onthe-spot responses to accusations.., about the more than half-million individuals employed not by it
but by its subcontractors halfway around the world"). Note that one of the factors present in that
observation, which may not be true with respect to reporting on taxes and so forth, is the time element.
Presumably tax returns do not have to be prepared "on the spot." Nevertheless, the best source of the
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various laws, such as those governing taxes and securities regulation, require
Nike to compile this information. Any difficulties with compliance that arise due
to a business' large size are generally seen as ones the business must solve, not as
grounds for absolving the entity of the duty to truthfully report the information.
That this is the price of doing business does not seem unfair. The
consequences of a failure to recognize such concerns as labor and environmental
practices as legitimate commercial concerns for consumers is that consumers will
not be able to verify claims about labor, environmental, or other "moral"
practices. If a product is advertised as "cruelty-free," consumers will have no
way to determine whether this statement is true or not. If consumers cannot
verify such claims, some manufacturers will be able to free ride on the efforts of
others, that is, they will be able to make the claim without incurring any of the
costs that may be involved in ensuring the truth of the claim.
Ultimately, this will likely discourage manufacturers from incurring those
costs or changing their practices. No method would exist to ensure that they
could benefit from such investments by appealing to the segment of the market
interested in so limiting their purchases. The market would be cluttered with
similar products making similar claims but presumably being marketed at lower
prices - lower prices that are the result, for example, of not having to pay the
extra manufacturing costs of a "living wage." When that happens, not only does
the consumer lose what he or she was seeking, but also the government's ability
to pursue goals such as a cleaner environment are seriously hampered.
There is no real dispute that consumers have become increasingly
concerned about environmental issues and that many wish to base their
purchasing decisions on the criteria of which products are most "green." This
increased concern has created a "virtual explosion throughout the United States
' 252
in 'green marketing.'
Common household products boast that they are recyclable, biodegradable,
compostable, ozone-friendly, or some other shade of green. Manufacturers
claim that they produce wood products only from sustainable harvesting
practices, free from clear-cutting, or other environmental abuse. Organic food is
advertised as being produced without reliance upon agricultural chemicals or
biotechnology. Energy is marketed as "clean," generated from wind, water, or
solar power, not from the burning of coal or use of nuclear power. Even tuna
253
fish is claimed to be dolphin-free.
It surely cannot be the case that the government ought to be powerless to
regulate such claims.5
information is still the company.
252. Brief of Amici Curiae of Sierra Club et al. at *6, 2002 U.S. Briefs 575, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
253. Id. at 6-7 (citing David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution:
Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REv. 441 (1994)).
See also, Stephen Gardner, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of Environmental Marketing
Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 31, 31 (1991) (recommending that Federal Trade Commission adopt
federal guidelines for environmental claims in advertising).
254. The Federal Trade commission actually has issued guidelines for assessing environmental
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C. The Implicationsfor ConsumerProtection
A central theme in the Nike case was harm-where's the harm and to
whom? Much was made of the fact that Kasky did not claim he was personally
injured in any way by Nike's alleged misstatements.
The United States
intervened as an amici on just this ground,2 5 stating it was Kasky's status as a
"private attorney general" that represented the objectionable part of the
California decision, apparently overlooking the fact that Nike's arguments would
seem to apply with equal force to the "public" attorney general. 256 This question
of harms, i.e., who is harmed and what is the harm, is central to whether or not a
consumer is "harmed" if he is told that a product is not made under sweatshop
conditions when in fact it is (whatever a "sweatshop" may be). Nike's position
would seem to be that such harms, if any, are inchoate and incapable of redress
through the courts because they are harms to moral or ethical sensibilitiespresumably sensibilities outside of the purview of government regulation.
Consumer interest in these topics is no more irrational or inchoate than its
interest in purchasing Borden milk rather than the house brand, even if the
products are identical.-5 7 Corporations like Nike are quick to defend this
consumer interest because this "difference" in brands is, while in some sense not
"real," manufactured by virtue of commercial advertising. This advertising
creates a consumer impression (however unfounded or irrational) that the name
258
brand is somehow better and thus can be claimed as a commercial interest.
Such differences are supported, in part, by the argument that product investment
in the form of advertising has created this "difference." It is just as real as
corporate goodwill, an item that represents a real asset on the balance sheet,
despite its somewhat inchoate form and ephemeral quality. 259 This element

claims. See 16 C.F.R. 260 (1994). However, the guidelines are not enforceable rules. And according
to some, the FrC has not been very effective in policing environmental claims. See Eric Orts,
Reflexive Environmental Law, 8 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1250-52 & n.103 (1995) ("[T]he effectiveness of
FTC enforcement in environmental marketing is questionable.").
255. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *7-8, 2003 WL 899100, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing First Amendment does not protect private plaintiffs
from a company's misrepresentation absent reliance and actual injury).
256. Of course, it is possible to argue that if the government, state and federal, were doing its job,
it would not be left to private attorney generals to bring such law suits. It is a matter of some note that
the California law was amended in the wake of the Nike case to eliminate the private attorneys'
general provision. See 2004 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. PROP. 64 (Proposition 64) [Approved by voters
November 2,2005].
257. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637,649-52 (1966).
258. Id. at 649 & n.3 (citing Brown, Advertising and the PublicInterest.-Legal Protectionof Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181 (1948) (who wrote that "[t]he buyer of an advertised good buys
more than a parcel of food or fabric; he buys the pause that refreshes, the hand that has never lost its
skill, the priceless ingredient that is the reputation of its maker").
259. For a discussion and a critique of this point see Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725 (1999) (stating that "[tihere has been
inexorable pressure to recognize as an axiom the principle that if something appears to have
substantial value to someone, the law must and should protect it as property"). Professor Litman
actually rejects this argument that trade symbols must necessarily be protected as property but
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reveals the degree to which Nike's argument imperils consumer protection
regulation.
As noted above, a number of laws, both state and federal, prohibit
manufacturers from labeling products as "Made in America," or by the blind, or
by Native Americans, unless these statements are demonstrably true. 26° Had
Nike prevailed, its argument would seem to render all of these regulations
unconstitutional to the extent that these claims are "moral" ones and not ones
going to "quality" or some product difference. However, this is by no means the
only sort of legislation that might be imperiled. As the National Association of
Consumer Advocates argued in its amicus brief in support of Kasky, much
consumer protection regulation shares the same "infirmities" that the Solicitor
General identified with the California statute in the Nike case, and "would
require [the] Court to effectively declare unconstitutional a large number of
unrelated statutes, including the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection
'261 Practices Act, the Consumer Leasing Act, and the Truth in Savings Act.
D. Antitrust, Tax, Securities, Trademark: More Unintended Consequences?
Much more regulation would seem to be directly affected, all of which, to
some extent or another, involve what for-profit corporations may or may not say.
Securities regulations are one example. Why should statements made in offering
circulars, prospectuses, and the like, which are also in a non-traditional
advertising format 262 and clearly represent "commercial speech" in some fashion,
not be affected by the acceptance of Nike's argument?
What about antitrust? As moribund as this area of the law seems to
currently be, (witness the United States backing away from the Microsoft case

suggests that they may serve the public interest by serving a competitive interest. Id. at 1730-31.
Another theory offered for protection of brands and trademarks is the reduction of transaction costs
by allowing a consumer to quickly associate a known product with its symbol. Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (stating by "[a] trade-mark is a
merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants."). The anonymous student author of a 2003 Harvard Law Review article suggests
that consumer protection ought to perhaps preserve the "badwill" inherent in trade names where the
name is associated with a bad product or service by not permitting companies to erase badwill by
virtue of a simple name change. Note, Badwill, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1845, 1866-67 (2003). Presumably
this suggestion too would be made more difficult, if not impossible, were Nike's position have won the
Court's support.
260. See Brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates at *17-19, Nike, Inc., 2003
WL 1844784 (No. 02-575) (discussing state statutes that regulate a company's manufacturing claims in
order to protect consumers).
261. Id. at *3 (referring to provision in California law that allowed for statutory damages even in
absence of proven injury, a point that the Solicitor General argued made the California statute at issue
infirm).
262. Of course, it is possible to point out that the reason they do so, the whole notion of a
"traditional advertising format," is itself an artifact of the laws that have dictated the format for
offering circulars and the like. Without those laws it is not clear that prospectuses and offering
circulars would even exist in their present form. However, this observation may take us in a circular
inquiry in more ways than one and is certainly beyond the scope of this article.
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after the election of George Bush), might acceptance of Nike's argument present
some additional challenges where anticompetitive behavior is alleged to occur
almost exclusively in the area of advertising, as it was with what was known as
"the Cereal Case"? 263 As it stands right now, the government already faces the
obstacle that product differentiation through advertising is not considered
inherently wasteful or anticompetitive. If all those marketing efforts were
constitutionally protected, particularly if they take place outside of the
traditional advertising format, how much more would that insulate industries
from claims of anticompetitive behavior related to advertising and other
marketing efforts?
Even more problematic, given that the subject matter is almost wholly
comprised of speech or expressive content, is trademark law, including passing
off and unfair competition generally, and copyright law. Here it appears safe to
assume that Nike and its supporters would vigorously assert that its arguments
should not apply to these areas, although it is not immediately clear why not. If
Nike's "contributions" to the debate about globalization are to be subject to
absolute protection, then it seems that similar claims about the safety of
hamburger in fast food restaurants 264 or of fruits and vegetables that may have
been sprayed with the pesticide Alar xu 265 should be similarly protected. For the
most part, they have been. However, that does not mean that the pervasive
influence of corporate press releases, leverage of advertising monies, use of
"Astroturf" consumer groups, 266 and industry-funded think tanks acting as fronts
for these interests do not result in something perhaps less informative than the
romantic notions about the "multitude of voices" Nike would have us believe is
necessary for an issue to be fully aired. To the contrary, it appears that the
problem is not that they can't be heard, but that they drown out dissent. For
instance in the case of AlarTM:
Industry-funded think tanks such as the Cato Institute, Heartland
Institute, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute hammered home

263. See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust
Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. 321, 336-37 (1990) (discussing the Cereal Case).
264. For a discussion of the criticisms launched against Eric Schlosser's indictment of the fastfood industry, see ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 276-80 (2002) (Afterword). Schlosser
describes in the Afterword various reactions, including widespread criticisms of the book after its first
publication, but notes "thus far its critics have failed to cite any errors in the text." Id. at 276.
265. See SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS! 226-29 (2001).
266. Authors John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton describe "Astroturf," a term used to describe
pseudo-grassroots movements:
Lloyd Bentsen, himself a long-time Washington and Wall Street insider, is credited with
coining the term "Astroturf lobbying" to describe the synthetic grassroots movements that
can now be manufactured for a fee by companies like Hill & Knowlton, Direct Impact,
Optima Direct, National Grassroots & Communications, Beckel Cowan, Burson-Marsteller,
Davies Communications or Bonner & Associates. Campaigns& Elections magazine defines
"Astroturf" as a "grassroots program that involves the instant manufacturing of public
support for a point of view in which either uninformed activists are recruited or means of
deception are used to recruit them.
STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 231, at 79.
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the argument that the "Alar scare" was an irrational episode of public
hysteria produced by unscrupulous manipulators of media
sensationalism.
Since 1989, this revisionist version of the Alar story has been
repeated over and over again, distorting events and omitting facts to
transform the story into a morality tale about the dangers of
environmental fearmongering,
governmental regulatory excess, and
267
media irresponsibility.
Apparently not satisfied with the results of such intensive public relations
campaigns, sometimes corporate interests have tried to suppress criticism of their
products or practices by bringing libel, trademark, unfair competition, or
disparagement actions. 268
The vast sums poured into creating a logo and an image create incentives to
protect these investments by trying to ensure that other manufacturers cannot
free-ride off the efforts of others by appropriating their label and logos and thus
confusing consumers about the origin of the product. This is the basis of the
protection for trademarks, trade dress, and the like.269 However, it also creates
incentives for corporations to try to suppress information about their practices
that may affect consumer impressions associated with that logo or that image,
including attempts to make political, policy, or social statements by
appropriating the corporate image. 270 An example of such an appropriation is

267. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 265, at 228-29. In the late Seventies and early Eighties,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted studies and concluded that Alar, a chemical
sprayed by American apple growers to make apples ripen more quickly, was a "probable human
carcinogen." Id. at 226. However, the EPA allowed the product to remain on the market. Id. In
1989, CBS-TV's 60 Minutes aired a segment featuring a commercial prepared by a public relations
committee for environmental groups which warned that Alar had been found in bottles of children's
apple juice. Id. at 227. After the broadcast, many American consumers boycotted apple products. Id.
Following the "Alar Scare," the apple industry initiated a massive campaign attacking Alar studies as
"junk science" and calling the 60 Minutes special "irresponsible journalism." RAMPTON & STAUBER,
supra note 265, at 228. As a result, many people today think the "Alar Scare" was overblown. Id. at
229.
268. See, e.g., World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding, on a motion to dismiss the WWF's defamation claim, that defendants' public
criticisms of wrestling programs created by plaintiff as responsible for deaths of four children
constituted "commercial speech" despite the fact that defendants were a non-profit organization
formed to engage in public criticism of media, it chairman, and a Florida defense attorney were not
engaged in the promotion of any product). For a criticism of this decision see Symposium Panel:
Trademark Dilution: Mosley and Beyond, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 849, 88889, n.204 (2004) (describing opinion as "incredibly overbroad and problematical"; presumably because
"the defendants were not in business and did not produce any product"). See also MasterCard Int'l
Inc. v. Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (March 8, 2004) (court granted summary judgment for
Nader campaign against MasterCard's attempt to claim that Nader's use of the "priceless" tag in his
campaign that mirrored MasterCard's ad campaigns was unfair competition, trademark dilution, etc.).
269. See Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the ConstitutionalEdge, 104 COLUM. L. REv.
161, 175 (2004) (stating that "[ulnless courts find the FTDA [Federal Trademark Dilution Act]
narrowly tailored in service of a substantial government interest, the Act should be deemed an
unconstitutionally broad regulation of commercial speech under the First Amendment").
270. For an explanation of the concept, see KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE UNCOOLING OF

2005]

GROUNDING NIKE

when advertising critics, wanting to take aim at the difference between what the
advertiser is selling and what it is providing, spoof Absolut Vodka ads with a
picture of an Absolut bottle bending over in a sagging posture with the tag line,
'271
"Absolut Impotence.
Predictably, the corporations that own these logos and images regularly
attempt to suppress such parody uses of what they view as their property.
Witness the effort made by Fox media to challenge humorist Al Franken's use of
the terms "fair and balanced. '272 The network claimed that these terms were
part of its trademarked logo and promotional material, and as such, were
proprietary. 273 The judge did not find the claim credible, but it should be of
concern that Fox's lawyers did not find such a claim so facially incredible, so
obviously unconstitutional or lacking in merit, that they felt an ethical obligation
to refuse to file the claim.274 Moreover, the owners of logos, trademarks, and
copyrighted material often do not even need to resort to legal action because
very often the organized media will not even run these ads in print or other
media. 275 It seems beyond dispute that Nike's commitment to a multitude of
tongues and open debate does not extend to appropriation of the "swoosh."
And if such appropriation was limited to commercial purposes, a distinction
would be viable. However, giant multinational corporations and corporate
interests have made clear that at least some of them will attempt to suppress not
only commercial uses of their copyrighted material, but also any use, whether
related to public debate or not, that threatens to tarnish the value of the
investment-even if only by the production of truthful information.
CONCLUSION

What is at stake here is the ambit of the exercise of legitimate governmental
regulatory authority. Nike and its corporate supporters like Exxon-Mobil and
M

AMERICAT 131-32 (1999).
271. See http://www.adbusters.org/spoofads/alcohol/absolutimpotence/ (providing picture of
spoof on Absolut Vodka) (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Adbusters is a magazine and website dedicated
to challenging consumer culture. Parodies like the "Absolut Impotence" are a feature of Adbusters'

"culture jamming" project. See also NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 279-309 (1999) (describing culture
jamming, the concept of parodying ads so as to change their messages).
272. See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6162(RLC), 2003
WL 23281520, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (denying Fox temporary restraining order).
273. Id. See also Phil Hirschkorn, Fox News Loses Attempt to Block Satirist's Book (Aug. 22,
2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/22/fox.franken/index.html (last visited Aug. 23,
2003).
274. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a)-(b) imposes upon lawyers the ethical obligation to ensure that all
claims are either supported under the law or merited by a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. Presumably Fox's lawyers were traveling under the latter
clause. Nevertheless, it is worth a moment's pause that Fox could consider this argument "in good
faith" while simultaneously arguing for Nike's "freedom" to offer whatever self-promoting statements
its executives care to make, without regard to whether they are truthful or will mislead the public
because of the contribution to a matter of public debate.
275. See, e.g., http://www.mediacarta.org (discussing major media outlets' refusal to carry an
Adbusters' parody ad criticizing fat content of McDonald's food) (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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Microsoft, as well as the industries which depend on them, including advertising
and public relations, 276 would like to confine the subject of governmental
regulation to explicit, factual claims in the context of traditional advertising.
Such a restriction would leave the government watching an ever-emptier field,
because these companies increasingly make few explicit, verifiable claims in that
context. These corporations would like to restrict the basis of consumer choice
to those factors they control: price, appearance, and the intangible "attributes"
that advertising creates. They would like to discourage consumer ability to make
buying decisions on the basis of things like labor and environmental practices,
where statements can be subject to legal sanction if false. Of course, they have
no problem encouraging consumers to purchase products on the basis of whether
or not they are "green" or "sweatshop free." They would just like to be spared
the nuisance of actually having to show that such claims are true or, perhaps
more to the point because such practices often involve costs, of making them be
true. For-profit corporations cannot be permitted to exercise such power. That
would be the real "imbalance."

276. One might add to this list traditional media because of the degree to which advertising
supports media and lowers the cost of supplying information to the public. Of course, it sometimes
does so at the cost of distorting the debate. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A
DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994) (arguing advertising hurts mass media's commitment to democratic
society).

